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THURGOOD MARSHALL AND THE
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
JONATHAN WEINBERGt
Thurgood Marshall announced his retirement on June 27, 1991,
after twenty-four years on the Supreme Court bench. Observers
from across the political spectrum, as is customary on such oc-
casions, issued statements of respect and admiration for Marshall's
accomplishments.' Many of those statements, and much of the
journalistic commentary on Marshall's resignation, singled out his
opinions in the area of civil rights and in areas of constitutional
law such as free speech, privacy, and the death penalty;2 many
focused not on his opinions, but on his accomplishments as the
chief litigator for the NAACP Legal Defense and Education Fund
before his appointment to the Second Circuit in 1961. 3
Marshall's legacy as a civil rights litigator is surely worth
remembering. He did more to change American society and the
t Assistant Professor, Wayne State University Law School. A.B. 1980,
Harvard College; J.D. 1983, Columbia Law School. The author clerked for
Justice Thurgood Marshall during the 1985-86 Term. He thanks Justice Marshall
for inspiration, and Jessica Litman for helpful comments on countless prior
drafts.
1. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 28, 1991, at Al, col. 5 (statements of
Senators Orrin Hatch and Joseph Biden).
2. See, e.g., N.Y. Times, June 28, 1991, at A10, col. 1 (discussing
Marshall's opinions in areas of school desegregation and the death penalty); N.Y.
Times, June 28, 1991, at A10, col. 3 (quoting Marshall's opinions in areas of
free speech, privacy, death penalty, and abortion); Wash. Post, July 1-7, 1991
(nat'l weekly ed.), at 6; NAT'L L.J., July 8, 1991, at 30 (quoting Marshall's
opinions in areas of civil rights, death penalty, and criminal law); A.B.A. J.,
Aug. 1991, at 15 ("Marshall's most eloquent words were ... on the death
penalty, on school busing and on issues affecting those on the lowest rung of
society").
3. See N.Y. Times, supra note 1 (statement of National Right to Life
Committee); N.Y. Times, June 28, 1991, at A10, col. 1; A.B.A. J., Aug. 1991,
at 14. Some commentators suggested that Marshall's pre-Court career outshone
his contributions as a Justice. See N.Y. Times, June 28, 1991, at A10, col. 1
(Marshall "may be remembered as someone who had at least as powerful an
influence on the Supreme Court before he joined it as while a member"); NAT'L
L.J., July 8, 1991, at 29 (quoting Prof. Charles Fried); A.B.A. J., supra
(conservative media personality Bruce Fein describes Marshall's "legacy as a
person [as] more important than that as a jurist").
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
American legal system, and to bring America closer to its ideal of
what this nation ought to be, than any other litigator ever has,
and he did it while confronting fearsome personal danger from
those who opposed the rights he was asserting. For that alone, he
stands as one of the greatest Americans this country has known. 4
Similarly, in evaluating Marshall's opinions, there is surely nothing
wrong with focusing on the areas in which he wrote with the most
passion, such as civil rights and the death penalty.
The focus on Marshall's accomplishments and opinions in areas
such as civil rights, however, threatens to obscure what he accom-
plished elsewhere. Marshall's opinions as a Supreme Court Justice
were, across the board, eloquent, astute, and perceptive. In this
article, therefore, I have chosen not to discuss the work for which
Marshall is best known. Others have done that and will continue
to do so; I doubt that any words of mine can add to theirs.
Instead, in this article I will discuss Marshall's opinions in the
area of administrative law.' I chose this focus for two reasons:
First, I teach administrative law, and so I began my research
already familiar with some of the cases. Second, and more im-
portantly, I believe that Marshall's opinions in this area offer
valuable insight into Thurgood Marshall as a Justice.
Marshall's administrative-law opinions stress that government
agencies must adhere to the mandates set out for them by the
legislature, and that courts must be vigilant in monitoring that
adherence. In his landmark opinion for the Court in Citizens to
Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe (Overton Park),6 Marshall em-
phasized that courts must have authority to review a broad range
of agency decisions, and must hold those decisions up to searching
scrutiny, in order to ensure each agency's compliance with statutory
commands. I will discuss Marshall's Overton Park opinion at some
length; it displays basic themes characterizing Marshall's attitudes
towards judicial review of agency action.
The most important of these themes was a skepticism towards
the exercise of government authority; for Marshall, government
officials got no free ride. Their decisions, he believed, were at
least as likely to be invidious or incompetent as anyone else's.
Marshall was therefore committed to judicial review as a means
4. See generally R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSnCE (1977).
5. I will limit my analysis, further, to Marshall's opinions concerning
judicial review of agency action. Other areas of administrative law, such as
agencies' obligations under the due process clause, are beyond the scope of this
article.
6. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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of protecting citizens from lawless government action. Where an
agency is charged with violating the law, he maintained, the mere
fact that the challenged administrative official might be said to be
politically responsible is no reason for a court to defer; it is the
proper role of courts is to check the legality of challenged govern-
ment action at the behest of aggrieved citizens. Moreover, he
continued, a court has the right to demand from the agency
sufficient information for the court to fulfill its oversight role.
Marshall's attitudes toward judicial review proved generally
consistent with his overall liberal political views. He wrote opinions
challenging agency performance in carrying out the congressional
mandate in areas such as benefits for the indigent 7 and the disa-
bled, 8 protection of the environment 9 and of threatened species, 10
7. See Miller v. Youakim, 440 U.S. 125 (1979) (Marshall, J.) (overturning
a restrictive state-agency definition of "foster family home" within the meaning
of the federal Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) statute); Burns
v. Alcala, 420 U.S. 575 (1975) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (attacking what Marshall
characterized as a newly-developed Department of Health and Human Services
position denying additional AFDC benefits to pregnant women); Ortwein v.
Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (challenging whether a
state could deny indigents judicial review of administrative decisions reducing
their welfare benefits).
8. See Mullins Coal Co. v. Director, Office of Workers' Compensation
Programs, 484 U.S. 135 (1987) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Department of Labor's
procedures for awarding black lung benefits were inconsistent with the Depart-
ment's own regulations and with congressional intent); Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S.
104 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (district court properly issued statewide order
requiring Department of Health and Human Services to process disability claims
within specific deadlines); Heckler v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458 (1983) (Marshall,
J., concurring and dissenting) (agency gave disability claimant inadequate hear-
ing). For a case addressing another sort of benefits statute, see UAW v. Brock,
477 U.S. 274 (1986) (Marshall, J.) (union may file federal-court suit challenging
Department of Labor's interpretation of trade readjustment benefits statute).
9. See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 470
U.S. 116 (1985) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Environmental Protection Agency
practice of allowing certain Clean Water Act variances was inconsistent with the
statute); United States v. SCRAP, 412 U.S. 669 (1973) (Marshall, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part) (district court had power, pending final judicial
determination, to force Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) to suspend a
railroad rate where ICC's failure to do so was assertediy illegal under the National
Environmental Policy Act and threatened irreversible ecological damage); see also
Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223 (1980) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (Department of Housing and Urban Development may have given
insufficient attention to "social environmental impact" in approving siting plan
for low-income housing).
10. See Japan Whaling Ass'n v. American Cetacean Soc'y, 478 U.S. 221
(1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Secretary of Commerce's failure to take statu-
torily prescribed action against countries departing from International Whaling
Commission schedules was inconsistent with Whaling Act).
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voting rights," and rights of the handicapped.12 Marshall's em-
phasis on legislative primacy and his recognition of the legitimate
needs of the administrative process, however, led him to reject
claims accepted by some of his liberal colleagues. 3 Indeed, in
Overton Park, Marshall rejected the position of Justices Black and
Brennan imposing stringent procedural requirements on an agency
decision; those requirements, Marshall held, were simply nowhere
found in the statute.1
4
For Marshall, governing statutory law played the central role
in determining the legality and appropriateness of any agency
action. Marshall saw statutes in the Austinian 5 sense, as legislative
command; Congress' directive was the central towering presence
in any review of agency action, and the ultimate justification for
that review. He was committed to judicial review not only to
protect citizens from lawless action, but also to guarantee to them
the benefits of lawful action; he made clear that judicial review
should not be a one-way ratchet, dedicated to preventing the
government from taking any action for fear that that action might
be flawed. The key issue, rather, was whether the agency was
making a sufficient effort to comply with the statutory directive.
11. See Morris v. Gressette, 432 U.S. 491 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting)
(Attorney General's failure to object to state's voting-law change subject to
Voting Rights Act preclearance was subject to judicial review).
12. See United States Dep't of Transp. v. Paralyzed Veterans of Am., 477
U.S. 597 (1986) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Civil Aeronautics Board erred in failing
to subject commercial airlines to § 504 requirements); Community Television of
S. Cal. v. Gottfried, 459 U.S. 498 (1983) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (Federal
Communication Commission erred in refusing to consider, in license-renewal
proceeding, allegation that broadcast station failed to comply with § 504).
13. For example, Marshall in United States v. Locke, 471 U.S. 84 (1985),
upheld the agency's forfeiture of unpatented mining claims because the holders
had filed their annual notice of intent to work the claim on December 31; the
statute required filing "prior to December 31." The statute, Marshall explained,
was clear; the Court had no cause to rewrite its language to mean "on or before
December 31," even if individual Justices might think that would be a fairer
rule. Justices Brennan, Powell, and Stevens dissented. In McGee v. United States,
402 U.S. 479 (1971), Marshall rejected the belated attempt of a defendant,
charged with refusal to submit to draft induction, to assert ministerial student
or conscientious objector status. That claim was barred by the doctrine of
exhaustion of administrative remedies because defendant had not sought to build
a record before the agency on these factual issues and had not given the agency
a fair chance to pass on them. Justice Douglas dissented.
14. See infra note 63 and accompanying text.
15. See Rodgers, Judicial Review of Risk Assessments: The Role of Decision
Theory in Unscrambling the Benzene Decision, 11 Ei~vTm. L. 301, 313 (1981).
[Vol. 38:115
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Where Marshall believed that an agency was flouting the
statutory mandate, consequently, he had little patience for argu-
ments that the agency's choices were somehow immune from
review. In his opinion in Heckler v. Chaney,16 he rejected the
Court's position that agency decisions not to take action should
be presumptively unreviewable; such a rule, he argued, wrongly
immunized illegal or irrational agency choices.' 7
Marshall took a more forgiving approach where he was satisfied
that the agency sought to advance statutory goals. A court disserves
law and the legislative scheme, he argued, when, in the name of
rational governance, it prevents the agency from advancing its
congressional mandate. In his dissenting opinion in Industrial
Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute (Benzene),18
Marshall made a strong plea for the Court to defer to the De-
partment of Labor's predictive judgment in issuing a workplace
safety standard.' 9 Where it was unquestioned that the agency's
failure to act would lead to additional cancer deaths, he main-
tained, the Court had no authority to demand that the agency's
uncertainty as to how many lives would be lost be resolved in
favor of inaction. 20
In this article, I will discuss opinions that Marshall wrote in
administrative-law cases. In this enterprise, I must disclose my
bias: my discussion will unavoidably be tinged by the respect and
love that I feel for him. I hope to describe his jurisprudence, and
to shed some light on the sort of Justice that he was. I will also
look critically at Marshall's administrative-law jurisprudence, and
evaluate his views against the background of competing ap-
proaches. I hope that in this manner I can use his writings to raise
some questions about administrative law, and to suggest some
answers.
In Part I of this article, I will discuss the Overton Park case;
in Part II, I will introduce some objections to the vision of
16. 470 U.S. 821 (1985) (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).
17. Id. at 841.
18. 448 U.S. 607-(1980).
19. Id. at 689-90.
20. Id. at 705. For another case in which Marshall emphasized the costs
of a ruling that would seize on imperfections in the agency action to frustrate
the agency's mandate, see NLRB v. J.H. Rutter-Rex Mfg., 396 U.S. 258 (1969)
(Marshall, J.) (reviewing court may not reduce a backpay award against an
employer merely .because NLRB delayed in issuing it and backpay continued to
accumulate during period of delay; reversing agency would unfairly penalize
employees, who are innocent and entitled to their remedy).
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administrative law embodied in Marshall's opinion in that case. I
will consider those objections in Parts III, IV, and V of the article.
In Part III, I will discuss rationality review of administrative action;
in Part IV, review of agency statutory interpretations; and in Part
V, the question of when agency action is subject to review at all.
I. OVERTON PARK
Marshall's "ubiquitously-cited"'21 opinion in Overton Park con-
cerned a judicial challenge to the Secretary of Transportation's
approval and funding of a highway in Memphis, Tennessee. Under
the statutory scheme, still in force, highways that are to be part
of the national highway system are sited and designed in the first
instance by state highway departments. Once the location and
design of such a highway are approved by the Secretary of Trans-
portation in a consultative process, the federal government bears
ninety percent of the cost of the highway's construction.22
In Overton Park, the Tennessee Highway Department had been
working with the Department of Transportation since the 1940s
on a new east-west expressway through Memphis; state authorities
took the position that the expressway was best routed through
Overton Park, a large Memphis park of which the city was quite
proud. While routing the highway through the park would mean
destroying part of the park and marring the ambiance of much of
the rest, the state favored that course as preferable to routing the
highway around the park, and thus destroying numerous homes
and businesses in the highway's path. 23 Federal authorities prelim-
inarily approved that determination in 1956 and again in 1966.24
Later in 1966, however, Congress passed an amendment to the
Department of Transportation Act narrowing the Secretary's power
to approve such decisions. 2 The new language forbade the Secre-
21. J. MAsHAw & R. MERRILL, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW: TiH AMERICAN
PUBLIC LAW SYSTEM 628 (2d ed. 1985).
22. 23 U.S.C. § 120(c) authorizes that payment in the interests of "the
prompt and early completion of the ... System of Interstate and Defense
Highways." Id. § 101(b). The statute leaves selection of the highway routes "to
the greatest extent possible" to the states, subject to the Secretary's approval,
and requires the states to submit "such surveys, plans, specifications and estimates
... as the Secretary may require." Id. §§ 103(e)(1), 106(a).
23. Appendix at 67-72, Overton Park [hereinafter Overton Park Appendix].
24. See Overton Park, 401 U.S. at 406-07; Overton Park Appendix at 34-
35, 38.
25. Department of Transportation Act of 1966, Pub. L. No. 89-670, 80
Stat. 934, § 4(f) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1988)).
[Vol. 38:115
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tary to approve any highway through a publicly owned park unless
"there is no feasible and prudent alternative to the use of such
land" and there has been "all possible planning to minimize harm
to such park."' 26 The provision became effective in 1967; it was
amended the following year in ways not relevant here27 and was
incorporated into the Federal-Aid Highway Act. 2
Routing the highway through Overton Park was the subject of
no little controversy in Memphis. On March 5, 1968, the Memphis
City Council passed a resolution opposing the Overton Park rout-
ing and urging that state and federal governments select another
route, placing the highway along the north perimeter of the park
"if no better route [could] be obtained." 29 The next month,
however, the City Council reversed its position.30 Its new resolution
explained that the state and federal governments had furnished it
with "considerable information and data to the effect that no
other feasible and prudent route [was] available"; that "further
study and hearings could materially affect the beginning of the
construction," which was "very essential for the growth and
progress of the City of Memphis"; and that the Overton Park
route therefore was "the feasible and prudent location for said
road."'" The Federal Highway Administration shortly thereafter
issued a press release announcing that, in light of the City Council's
finding that the Overton Park route was "feasible and prudent,"
the Department of Transportation had "reconfirmed" its approval
26. Id.
27. The changes included the addition of a requirement that the park be
found to be of "national, State, or local significance." Pub. L. No. 90-495, 82
Stat. 815, 824 (1968).
28. 23 U.S.C. § 138. House members and Senators in 1968 inserted con-
flicting statements in the legislative history characterizing the two statutes. Ac-
cording to the House members of the Conference Committee, the language was
intended to give the Secretary "discretionary authority," allowing him to approve
the use of parklands where alternative routes would require substantial numbers
of people to move, or would contravene "clearly enunciated local preferences."
Statement of the House Managers, H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 1789, 90th Cong., 2d
Sess. 32 (1968). Key Senators, on the other hand, repudiated that characterization.
They saw the language as giving the Secretary "no discretion." 114 Cong. Rec.
24033 (1968) (statements of Senators Randolph and Cooper).
29. Overton Park Appendix at 23.
30. Id. at 23-26.
31. Id. at 26. The Memphis Parks Commission, which had also opposed
the Overton Park route, acquiesced after the City Council's change of position.
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1195 (W.D.
Tenn.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
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of the route. 32 With the location approved, all that remained was
the design of the road; in November 1969, the Secretary approved,
with some modifications, the design submitted by the state.3
At this point, opponents of routing the highway through the
park filed suit. The district court granted summary judgment to
defendants. 34 The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed,
emphasizing the "presumption of regularity" accorded to admin-
istrative actions.35 The Supreme Court granted certiorari3 on an
expedited timetable; the case was argued five weeks after review
was granted, and the decision was handed down just seven weeks
after that.
As the matter came to the Supreme Court, Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park v. Volpe may not have seemed particularly difficult
or important. The Solicitor General, representing Secretary Volpe,
did not contest that the Secretary's decision was subject to judicial
review; 37 indeed, he largely confessed error. Under SEC v. Chenery
32. Overton Park Appendix at 36. Federal Highway Administrator Bridwell
later testified before a Senate subcommittee that he had told the City Council
that the decision where to locate the highway was up to them, based on "their
intuitive and subjective judgment" as to the competing values of preserving
parkland and avoiding dislocation of homes and businesses. Urban Highways:
Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Roads of the Senate Comm. on Public Works,
90th Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 480 (part 2) (1968).
33. The state highway department submitted a design in which the highway
would be depressed through part, but not all, of its passage through the park;
it rejected the options of placing the highway in a tunnel under the park and of
depressing the highway throughout. Assistant Secretary Braman, approving the
plan, explained in a press release that the plan "is the most reasonable now open
to us and is designed to do minimum damage to the park." Overton Park
Appendix at 37. Alluding to the fact that President Nixon had taken office only
ten months earlier, he continued: "The options of this Administration were few,
mainly because the route of the highway had previously been determined." Id.
34. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1195
(W.D. Tenn.), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
35. 432 F.2d 1307, 1310 (6th Cir. 1970), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
36. 400 U.S. 939 (1970).
37. The Solicitor General stated that 49 U.S.C. § 1655(h) (which subjects
all "proceedings by the Department [of Transportation] and any of the admin-
istrations or boards within the Department" to the Administrative Procedure
Act) subjected the Secretary's decision to judicial review. See Brief for the
Secretary of Transportation at 31 n.32, Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v.
Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (No. 1066). He did not otherwise address reviewability.
Lower courts had reviewed the decisions of the Secretary in similar contexts. See
D.C. Fed'n of Civic Ass'ns v. Volpe, 316 F. Supp. 754 (D.D.C. 1970), rev'd,
459 F.2d 1231 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1030 (1972); Triangle
Improvement Council v. Ritchie, 314 F. Supp. 20 (D.W. Va. 1969), aff'd, 429
F.2d 423 (4th Cir. 1970); Road Review League, Town of Bedford v. Boyd, 270
F. Supp. 650 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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Corp.,3" the Solicitor General conceded, "[t]he grounds upon which
an administrative order must be judged are those upon which the
record discloses that its action was based." 3 9 Because the admin-
istrative record had not been presented to the lower courts, he
continued, if the Court found the issue presented whether the
Secretary's determinations were arbitrary, it should not affirm
those courts' favorable determinations. Rather, it should rerand
so that the district court could resolve the Secretary's summary
judgment motion on the basis of the documents available to the
Secretary when he made his decision. 40 The Solicitor General
disagreed with petitioners, for the most part, only over whether
the Court should remand to the Secretary or to the district judge,
and what the terms of that remand should be. While the State of
Tennessee took issue with almost all of the Solicitor General's
concessions, its brief was by far the least skillfully drafted of the
three.
When the case was argued before the Supreme Court, thus, it
may be that nobody expected the opinion to be particularly sig-
nificant. Today, however, the opinion is seen as one of the most
influential postwar Supreme Court opinions regarding judicial re-
view of agency action, "the cornerstone of the prevailing judicial
posture." 41
What is it about the Overton Park opinion that led it to such
prominence? One aspect, surely, is its treatment of the question
of reviewability. The State of Tennessee took the position that the
courts had no authority under the Administrative Procedure Act
(APA)42 to review the Secretary's decisions concerning Overton
Park; the state premised its argument on 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2),
which excludes from APA coverage "agency action ... committed
to agency discretion by law." ' 43 Since both the legislative history
and the "feasible and prudent" language of the Department of
Transportation Act and Federal-Aid Highway Act conferred dis-
cretion on the Secretary, the state reasoned, the Secretary's deci-
38. 318 U.S. 80 (1943).
39. Id. at 87; see Brief for the Secretary of Transporation at 31, Overton
Park.
40. Id. at 32-35.
41. J. MAsHuw & R. MERRIL , supra note 21, at 628.
42. 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-559, 701-706, 1305, 3105, 3344, 5372, 7521 (1964 &
Supp. V 1970).
43. 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1964 & Supp. V 1970).
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sions were "committed to agency discretion by law" and the APA
granted no power of judicial review. 44
Marshall, writing for the Court, rejected the state's argument.
The exception for action "committed to agency discretion," he
wrote, is "very narrow;" it is limited to cases where "statutes are
drawn in such broad terms that . . .there is no law to apply. '45
Even though Congress may have intended a government actor to
exercise discretion in making a decision, so long as Congress
provided any standards to constrain that discretion, the decision
is subject to judicial review to examine whether the actor con-
formed to the statutory command. 6
In this case, Marshall continued, Congress provided standards
to constrain the Secretary. Because the legislative history was
ambiguous, 47 he stated, the Court should look to "the statutes
themselves" to deduce the legislative intent. 48 He found the statutes
themselves to circumscribe the Secretary's discretion sharply.49
It is obvious that in most cases considerations of costs,
directness of route, and community disruption will indicate
that parkland should be used for highway construction
whenever possible .... [S]ince people do not live and work
in parks, if a highway is built on parkland no one will
have to leave his home or give up his business .... [I]f
44. Brief of Respondent Speight at 37-38, Citizens to Preserve Overton
Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971) (No. 1066); see also id. at 20-21 & n.19.
45. 401 U.S. 402, 410 (quoting S. Rep. No. 752, 79th Cong., 1st Sess. 26
(1945)); see also H.R. Rep. No. 1980, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 41 (1946):
Where laws are so broadly drawn that agencies have large discretion,
the situation cannot be remedied by an administrative procedure act but
must be treated by the revision of statutes conferring administrative
powers. However, where statutory standards, definitions, or other grants
of power deny or require action in given situations or confine an agency
within limits as required by the Constitution, then the determination of
the facts does not lie in agency discretion but must be supported by
either the administrative or judicial record.
Id.
46. Review, however, may be foreclosed on other grounds. In particular,
the APA grants courts no authority to review agency action if there is clear and
convincing evidence that Congress meant to prohibit review. 401 U.S. at 410;
see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(1) (1988). Similarly, agency action that is not "final" is
not subject to review unless some other statute explicitly so provides. 5 U.S.C.
§ 704 (1988).
47. See supra note 28.




Congress intended these factors to be on an equal footing
with preservation of parkland there would have been no
need for the statutes.
[The very existence of the statutes indicates that
protection of parkland was to be given paramount impor-
tance. The few green havens that are public parks were not
to be lost unless there were truly unusual factors present
in a particular case or the cost or community disruption
resulting from alternative routes reached extraordinary mag-
nitudes. If the statutes are to have any meaning, the
Secretary cannot approve the destruction of parkIand unless
he finds that alternative routes present unique problems. 0
Because the statutes placed real constraints on the Secretary's
decisions, the APA granted persons aggrieved by those decisions
the right to go to the courts with their claim that the Secretary
was not abiding by Congress' command.5'
In defining "commnitted to agency discretion" as he did, Mar-
shall rejected other approaches discussed in the scholarly literature
he cited 52 (although not in the state's brief).53 Most importantly,
while the House and Senate Reports on the APA lent support to
the "no law to apply" approach,5 4 the Attorney General's report
50. Id. at 411-13.
51. Id. at 413.
52. See 401 U.S. at 410 n.23 (citing literature).
53. The state's brief did include a reference to 4 K. DAVIs, ADMI'ISTRATIV
LAw TREATISE § 28.16 (1958). See Reply Brief of Respondent Speight at 38,
Overton Park. Professor Davis argued that § 701(a)(2) continued the pre-APA
common law of nonreviewability. See K. DAVIs, supra.
54. 401 U.S. at 110; see supra note 45; cf. Levin, Understanding Unre-
viewability in Administrative Law, 74 MnqN. L. Rm'. 689, 696-97, 705-09 (1990)
(finding that House and Senate reports best support interpretation that no
unlawful agency action is barred from review by § 701(a)(2), and querying
whether Marshall's formulation accomplishes that result).
Some commentators have criticized the Overton Park "no law to apply"
formulation on the ground that the standard improperly bars review or is
unworkable where an agency action, although subject to no statutory constraints,
is nonetheless rooted in misunderstanding of the facts, inconsistent application
of precedents, implausible reasoning, or an unconscionable value judgment. See
Levin, supra at 708; K. DAvis, ADMINITRATWVE LAW OF T=E SEVENTIES § 28.16,
at 639-40 (1976). These criticisms seem to be based on the view that rationality
review of agency action is wholly disconnected from the substantive statutory
law, and that the presence or absence of statutory standards is therefore irrelevant
19911
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to Congress on the APA could have been read to suggest a different
tack-that the section incorporated a broader, flexible common
law of unreviewability.55 Some commentators agreed with this
broader approach.5 6 One contemporary analyst presented a multi-
factored approach under which the expertise involved in highway
design, the "managerial" (and therefore polycentric) role of the
Department of Transportation, and the informality of the decision
would all cut against allowing review.57 In rejecting these interpre-
tations, Marshall emphasized the broad scope of APA review: The
courts would be open to almost any claim by a person aggrieved
that an agency of the government was flouting or misperceiving
its statutory mandate.58
Once it was established that the Secretary's decision was subject
to judicial review, the next question was how the courts should
undertake such review. In this respect, too, Marshall's opinion
was important.5 9 Informal action such as the Secretary's in this
case, he explained, is reviewed under the "arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law"
to such review. See Levin, supra, at 708. Marshall did not share that belief. See,
e.g., infra notes 98-108 and accompanying text. He did, however, much later in
his career, to some degree adopt the views of his critics on this reviewability
issue. See infra note 243.
55. See Levin, supra note 54, at 695-96. This approach has most recently
been championed by Justice Scalia. See Webster v. Doe, 486 U.S. 592, 606-10
(1988) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
56. See K. DAvis, supra note 54; Saferstein, Nonreviewability: A Functional
Analysis of "Committed to Agency Discretion," 82 HARV. L. Rv. 367 (1968)
(setting out eight factors courts should consider in deciding whether particular
agency action is reviewable); see also Hahn v. Gottlieb, 430 F.2d 1243 (Ist Cir.
1970).
57. See Saferstein, supra note 56, at 382-86, 387-89.
Professor Raoul Berger, by contrast, took the position in a series of some-
times emotional articles that § 701(a)(2) should never be read to bar review of
arbitrary agency action. See Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Synthesis,
78 YALE L.J. 965 (1969); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness: A Sequel, 51
MiNN. L. REv. 601 (1967); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness-A Rejoinder to
Professor Davis' "Final Word," 114 U. PA. L. REv. 816 (1966); Berger, Ad-
ministrative Arbitrariness-A Reply to Professor Davis, 114 U. PA. L. REv. 783
(1966); Berger, Administrative Arbitrariness and Judicial Review, 65 COLUM. L.
REv. 55 (1965).
58. 401 U.S. at 410.
59. See Mashaw & Harfst, Regulation and Legal Culture: The Case of
Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257, 275 n.40 (1987) (Overton Park is
the Court's "most comprehensive statement" of scope-of-review principles).
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test of 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). 0 In the application of that standard,
while "the Secretary's decision is entitled to a presumption of
regularity ... that presumption is not to shield his action from a
thorough, probing, in-depth review." 61 An agency's decision cannot
stand if the agency misconstrued the statutory command, failed to
consider factors that the statute makes relevant, or made a clear
error of judgment; it cannot stand if it cannot "reasonably be
said to be within" the range specified by Congress.6 2 "Although
this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and careful, the
ultimate standard of review is a narrow one. The court is not
empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the agency. ' 6
Going about that review in this case would not be easy. The
Secretary had left no contemporaneous explanation or other formal
paper trail on the basis of which his decision could conveniently
be reviewed. His informal, unmemorandized decision was thus
remarkably resistant to after-the-fact scrutiny. Marshall rejected
the argument that the Secretary's failure to make explicit contem-
poraneous findings was itself a statutory violation64-neither the
APA nor either of the substantive statutes, after all, explicitly
required such findings61-but the absence of such findings raised
the question how the district court was supposed to undertake the
"searching and careful" review the Court described.66 How was
the district court to decide whether the Secretary knew the statutory
constraints on his decision, and whether the Secretary's actual
decision was made with those constraints in mind?
60. 401 U.S. at 416. Defendants challenged whether plaintiffs' complaint
actually raised the issue whether the Secretary's action was arbitrary, but the
Court found the issue squarely before it. Id. at 408 n.16.
61. 401 U.S. at 415 (citations omitted).
62. Id. at 416.
63. Id.
64. 401 U.S. at 417-19. In this, his view differed from that of Justices
Black and Brennan, who saw the statutes as "a solemn determination of the
highest law-making body of this Nation that the beauty and health-giving facilities
of our parks are not to be taken away for public roads without hearings,
factfindings, and policy determinations under the supervision of... the Secretary
of Transportation." 401 U.S. at 421 (separate opinion of Justice Black). Justices
Black and Brennan concluded, somewhat imaginatively, that the statutes discussed
in text, together with 23 U.S.C. § 128, a statutory provision requiring state
highway departments to hold public hearings on the location and design of
highways, required the Secretary himself to hold "hearings-hearings that a court
can review," and to make explicit findings growing out of those hearings. Id. at
422.
65. Id. at 417.
66. See id. at 419-21.
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The Solicitor General's response was simple: the district court
need only look to "the full administrative record." 67 According to
the Solicitor General's brief, all parties agreed on the nature of
the administrative record, which included all of the information
the Secretary had before him when he made the decisions under
review, and "consist[ed] of one carton (approximately file-drawer
size) of documents." With that carton of documents before it,
the Solicitor General argued, the district court could examine all
of the information available to the Secretary when he made his
decision, and could properly dispose of the case. 69
Marshall, however, recognized that the problem was more
difficult. The contents of that file-drawer size carton, he cautioned,
"may not disclose the factors that were considered or the Secre-
tary's construction of the evidence.' '70 And indeed, as later com-
mentators have emphasized, it is not generally the case in informal
agency decisionmaking that "all documents critical in reaching a
given agency decision are in fact placed 'before' the head of the
agency," or that those documents necessarily are easy to assemble
when it comes time for judicial review. 71 Therefore, Marshall
continued, in order for the district court to understand the Secre-
tary's decision, it was empowered to require the Secretary to
"prepare formal findings.., that will provide an adequate expla-
nation for his action," or, in the absence of such findings, to
require agency decisionmakers to testify. Those steps might be
"the only way . . . [to engage in] effective judicial review. "72
In so ruling, Marshall rejected alternatives that might have left
the world of administrative law with a different shape. On the
67. See id. at 420 n.34.
68. Brief for the Secretary of Transportation at 30-31 n.3 1, Overton Park.
69. Id. at 34-35.
70. 401 U.S. at 420.
71. Pedersen, Formal Records and Informal Rulemaking, 85 YALE L.J. 38,
62 (1975). The Overton Park opinion has been criticized for "blandly assert[ing]"
that there existed an administrative record in connection with the Secretary's
decision. See G. RoBINsoN, E. GELLHORN & H. BRuFF, TnE ADMwNIsTRATIvE
PROCESS 175-76 (3d ed. 1986); Nathanson, Probing the Mind of the Administrator:
Hearing Variations and Standards of Judicial Review under the Administrative
Procedure Act and Other Federal Statutes, 75 CoLum. L. REv. 721, 723 (1975)
("The Court . . . seemed to assume that there was somewhere an elaborate
administrative record which could easily be produced."). That assertion, however,
was a straightforward reliance on the Solicitor General's representations; the
Court was skeptical whether the Solicitor General's neat solution would indeed
solve the problem of review. See 401 U.S. at 420.
72. 401 U.S. at 420.
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one hand, he rejected any understanding of the agency's "pre-
sumption of regularity" under which a court could uphold the
agency's decision without a firm understanding of the agency's
decisional process.73 If the record the agency produced was insuf-
ficient to make its reasoning clear, the court would have to look
beyond that record; no other course would allow the court to
perform its role of monitoring the agency's compliance with the
statute. He emphasized further that the reviewing court could not
fulfill this duty simply by relying on litigation affidavits purporting
to reconstruct the agency's reasoning. 74
On the other hand, Marshall rejected the option of requiring
the agency to follow formal procedures in order to ensure a
transparent, trial-type decision.7 Moreover, he gave the court no
authority to supplement the record by collecting its own evidence
pertaining to the merits of the controversy. 76 Rather, the burden
was on the agency, as it saw fit, to compile a contemporaneous
record that would allow the reviewing court to do its job. If the
agency failed to do so, it would be subject to the intrusion of a
court order designed to make the agency's reasoning more plain;
but if the agency did compile a record sufficient to expose its
reasoning, the court had no authority to look elsewhere.77
II. QUESTIONING JUDIcIAL REVIEw
In recent years, some scholars have questioned whether the era
of searching and easily available judicial review ushered in by
Overton Park has brought us unmitigated good. In a prominent
administrative law casebook, Professors Mashaw and Merrill out-
line an argument that Overton Park was wrongly decided; the
highway issues at stake there, they suggest, were the sort in which
courts ought not to interfere. Courts, after all, have no expertise
in highway planning, which requires "continuous negotiation and
73. Cf. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 432 F.2d 1307,
1310 (6th Cir. 1970) (emphasizing the "presumption of regularity" in upholding
the Secretary's action), rev'd, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
74. 401 U.S. at 419.
75. See supra note 63.
76. Id. That course was nonetheless essayed by the Court of Appeals for
the Fourth Circuit in the later case of Camp v. Pitts, 463 F.2d 632 (4th Cir.
1972), vacated, 411 U.S. 138 (1973); the Supreme Court reversed summarily,
explaining that the lower court's approach was not the one "contemplated by
Overton Park." 411 U.S. at 143.
77. See 401 U.S. at 417-21.
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accommodation among [political] actors" and a balancing of a
host of interrelated considerations. 8 It is wrong, the authors
suggest, to subject highway plans, which were (and are) developed
through a lengthy political process of intergovernmental consul-
tation, to "rational," ahistorical, apolitical judicial scrutiny.79
Arguments against judicial review such as these, I believe, rest
on two essential concerns. The first, in its strongest form, is that
making routine agency actions subject to judicial review is fun-
damentally misguided, because agencies should be free to carry
out their functions through an ineffable, politically and historically
directed, nonscientific way of thinking inconsistent with strict
conformity with legal authority.80 The second is that close judicial
review may be counterproductive because courts, intruding in areas
in which they have little expertise or institutional competence, are
likely to reach bad results or to be manipulated by deep-pocketed
litigants."
78. J. MAsHAw & R. MERRILL, supra note 21, at 636. One of the authors
of the Memphis highway plan stated in an Overton Park affidavit that highway
planning "involves literally thousands of ideas all of which are interrelated to
each other." He continued: "Perhaps nowhere is the truism 'everything is related
to everything else' more appropriate .... ." Overton Park Appendix at 105
(affidavit of William S. Pollard). Such polycentric decisionmaking, it has been
argued, cannot easily be reviewed in the judicial forum. See generally Fuller, The
Forms and Limits of Adjudication, 92 HARv. L. REv. 353 (1978).
79. See J. MAsHAw & R. MERRmL, supra note 21, at 635-37.
80. Cf. Smith, Judicialization: The Twilight of Administrative Law, 1985
DuKE L.J. 427 (emphasizing value-laden, subjective, political nature of agency
decisionmaking).
81. See, e.g., R. MELNICK, REGULATION AND THE CoURTs: THE CASE OF
THE CLEAR Am ACT (1983); Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 59; Pierce, The
Unintended Effects of Judicial Review of Agency Rules: How Federal Courts
Have Contributed to the Electricity Crisis of the 1990s, 43 ADMIN. L. REv. 7
(1991) [hereinafter Pierce, Unintended Effects]; Pierce, Two Problems in Admin-
istrative Law: Political Polarity on the District of Columbia Circuit and Judicial
Deterrence of Agency Rulemaking, 1988 DuKE L.J. 300, 327.
Some commentators have suggested that agencies should engage in negotiated
rulemaking precisely to avoid judicial review. See, e.g., Susskind & McMahon,
The Theory and Practice of Negotiated Rulemaking, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 133, 136
(1985) (advocating negotiated rulemaking as alternative to a system in which,
"[b]y encouraging and empowering regulatees to challenge agency decisionmaking
... Congress and the courts have simply increased the complexity, cost, and
time it takes to generate rules that can be implemented."). See generally Nego-
tiated Rulemaking Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-648, 104 Stat. 4970; Weinberg,
Broadcasting and the Administrative Process in Japan and the United States, 39
BurALo L. REv. 615, 631-32 (1991).
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The first argument is more easily addressed. It is hardly con-
troversial that agencies are influenced by industry groups. It is
almost a cliche that agencies, if left to their own devices, may
take actions primarily serving their own agendas and those of their
clients.12 Those actions may have little or no connection with the
requirements of relevant statutes.83 In Overton Park, thus, the
institutional bias of both the federal Department of Transportation
and the state department of highways arguably was to build roads
at any -cost. Congress, responsive to environmental lobbying and
concerns, had imposed a statutory restriction designed to check
the Department of Transportation's natural instincts and to stop
it from advancing that institutional agenda. The Department,
however, did not see the statutory provision as a significant
constraint; it apparently put the final decision on the highway's
location to the Memphis City Council, itself under pressure from
state and federal highway authorities, and approved the City
Council's decision without hesitation.84 The statutory direction,
thus, was unavailing unless judicially enforceable.
In that situation, I believe, separation of powers required that
the Court seek to enforce its understanding of the legislative
command.85 The legislative process, after all, laughable or depress-
ing as it may seem at times, is there for a reason: huge amounts
of our national bounty are channeled into legislative disputes over
the smallest of details in statutory language. It would render that
system pointless to adopt a theory of administrative law under
which statutory language was deemed irrelevant to actual agency
choices. On the contrary, once a deal is struck in Congress and
82. See Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88
HAnv. L. REv. 1669, 1684-87 (1975); see also Weinberg, supra note 81, at 692-
709. Immediately before writing this footnote, I saw yet another story on the
evening news that an agency had withdrawn an educational publication because
of pressure from an industry group; this time, it was the EPA, finding too
controversial for publication the suggestion that people could reduce solid waste
by avoiding disposable cups and plates.
83. Cf. Funk, When Smoke Gets in Your Eyes: Regulatory Negotiation
and the Public Interest-EPA's Woodstove Standards, 18 ENVTL. L. 55, 66-89
(1987) (describing negotiated rules bearing only a tenuous relationship to their
purported statutory authorizations).
84. See supra note 32 and accompanying text.
85. See Stewart & Sunstein, Public Programs and Private Rights, 95 HAv.
L. REv. 1193, 1278-79 (1982). But see Diver, Statutory Interpretation in the
Administrative State, 133 U. PA. L. REv. 549, 574-92 (1985); Shapiro, APA:
Past, Present, Future, 72 VA. L. Rv. 447, 464-67 (1986) (concept of "statutory
duty" insulates bureaucrats from democratic control).
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embodied in a statute, it is important that there be some effective
mechanism86 through which an agency can be required to abide by
that deal.7 Nor, if our concern is that the agency will subordinate
the legislative command to political considerations and to the
interests of industry groups, can we rely on the agency to police
its own compliance. For these reasons, any approach to judicial
review based on a theory of agency decisionmaking "dependen[t]
on the nonrational, subjective, human-relations side of life"88 must
fail insofar as it rejects the task of measuring agency action against
the governing statute. Unless a court is able to carry out that
function, the agency can and will implement its own views regard-
less of the legislative direction. 89
This analysis, however, leaves unaddressed the argument that
close judicial review may be counterproductive because ill-in-
formed, incompetent, or overly stringent. In order to evaluate that
claim, one must turn to subsidiary issues: First, the ultimate issue
before the Court in Overton Park was whether the Department of
Transportation was acting in conformity with its governing statutes.
Yet what of judicial review not explicitly addressed to that ques-
86. While nonjudicial mechanisms, such as legislative oversight, are avail-
able for enforcing statutes, the control provided by such mechanisms is likely to
be even more random, sporadic, and superficial than that provided by judicial
review. See, e.g., Study on Federal Regulation: Congressional Oversight of
Regulatory Agencies, U.S. Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs, S. Doc.
No. 26, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., vol. 2, at 66-67 (1977).
Judicial review provides such a mechanism directly, by striking down agency
action inconsistent with the governing statute; it may also provide such a
mechanism indirectly, by enforcing procedural requirements at the agency level
that give parties favored by the deal an enhanced opportunity to block changes
that would disadvantage them. See McCubbins, Noll, & Weingast, Administrative
Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243 (1987).
87. Judicial review does not have these salutary effects if the reviewing
court misunderstands the relevant statute; the argument could be made that the
Overton Park Court did not interpret the Department of Transportation Act and
the Federal-Aid Highway Act in the manner most consistent with legislative
intent. That argument, though, does not support the view that judicial review is
fundamentally illegitimate; it raises the question whether courts are competent to
undertake it. As for that question, see infra Parts III & IV.
88. Frug, The Ideology of Bureaucracy in American Law, 97 HARv. L.
REv. 1276, 1318 (1984) (criticizing the model).
89. But see Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. National Resources Defense Council,
467 U.S. 837 (1984) (court has no power to reverse agency action so long as the
agency's position as to what the statute allows is "reasonable," even if the court
would otherwise have identified a more natural reading of the statute to the
contrary); infra Part IV.
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tion? Courts engaging in judicial review sometimes seek primarily
to test not an agency's fidelity to the statutory command, but the
rationality of its action. They thus ask whether there is a "rational
connection between the facts found and the choice made": 90 whether
the agency has "entirely failed to consider an important aspect of
the problem, offered an explanation . . . that runs counter to the
evidence before the agency, or is so implausible that it could not
be ascribed to a difference in view or the product of agency
expertise." 9' The Court in Overton Park had no occasion to engage
in such rationality review, but its language invited lower courts to
do so, and the courts have "enthusiastically accepted" that invi-
tation. 92 Is such review legitimate? How closely should the court
look? I will discuss Marshall's grappling with those questions in
Part III of this article.
Second, how closely must a court look when it is measuring
an agency's fidelity to its governing statute? In Overton Park, the
Court simply announced its understanding of the statutory mean-
ing; while the Court's construction was by no means the only
possible one, it was, the Court believed, the most logical and
natural reading of the law. 93 In later cases, however, the Court
adopted a different approach, indicating that a reviewing court
should not necessarily prefer its own views to those of the agency
regarding the meaning of a statute. 94 I will discuss Marshall's
response to the question of statutory interpretation in Part IV of
this article.
Finally, in Overton Park, the Court made clear a general
presumption in favor of reviewability. 9 Must the courts, though,
in order to preserve the societal benefits of judicial review, grant
review in every case? I will discuss Marshall's response to this
issue in Part V of this article.
90. Motor Vehicles Mfrs. Ass'n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463
U.S. 29, 43 (1983).
91. Id.
92. Pedersen, supra note 71, at 48.
93. For another possible reading of the statute, see Citizens to Preserve
Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 309 F. Supp. 1189, 1194-95 (W.D. Tenn. 1970)
(statute requires that highway "avoid the park if, after considering all relevant
factors, it is preferable to do so"), aff'd, 432 F.2d 1307 (6th Cir. 1971), rev'd,
401 U.S. 402 (1972).
94. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc., v. National Resources Defense Council, 467
U.S. 837 (1984); see also, e.g., Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. NRDC, 470 U.S. 116
(1985).
95. 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971).
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III. REvmw OF ADMINISTRATIVE RATIONALITY
Much judicial review of agency action does not seem addressed
to the fidelity of the agency action to some governing statute;
rather, it seems more nearly directed to the rationality of the
agency's action. How appropriate is that inquiry? On the one
hand, the Administrative Procedure Act requirement that courts
overturn "arbitrary [or] capricious" 96 agency action mandates some
degree of rationality review. On the other hand, separation-of-
powers concerns, which I earlier invoked in support of review
testing an agency's fidelity to the statutory command,9 7 may not
be so easily employed to support rationality review. In the absence
of a separation-of-powers grounding, might the scope of review
be drawn more narrowly?
For Marshall, rationality review was part and parcel of meas-
uring an agency's compliance with its governing statute. His opin-
ion in Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Board of
Trade,9 two years after Overton Park, illustrates his approach.
The case concerned prices charged by railroads to shippers of
grain. While the railroads had previously been willing to switch
railroad cars off a main line and onto a siding for inspection of
the grain the cars carried without any charge beyond the regular
line-haul rates, they now proposed to add a special charge for
such in-transit inspections. The Interstate Commerce Commission
approved the new charge, and plaintiffs sought review, alleging in
part that the Commission had failed to follow its own earlier
decisions. 99
Marshall began by explaining the judicial role: "A reviewing
court must be able to discern . . . the policy [the agency] is now
pursuing, so that it may ... determine whether [the agency's]
policies are consistent with its mandate from Congress.' °° In
order "to determine whether the course followed by the [agency]
is consistent with its mandate from Congress,"
the agency must set forth clearly the grounds on which it
acted. For '[w]e must know what a decision means before
the duty becomes ours to say whether it is right or wrong.'
96. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (1988); see supra note 60 and accompanying text.
97. See supra notes 84-88 and accompanying text.
98. 412 U.S. 800 (1973) (plurality opinion).
99. Id. at 805.
100. Id. at 805-06.
[Vol. 38:115
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
And we must rely on the rationale adopted by the agency
if we are to guarantee the integrity of the administrative
process. 101
Prior agency precedents, Marshall continued, were important in
that analysis:
A settled course of behavior embodies the agency's in-
formed judgment that, by pursuing that course, it will carry
out the policies committed to it by Congress.
There is, then, at least a presumption that those policies
will be carried out best if the settled rule is adhered to.
From this presumption flows the agency's duty to explain
its departure from prior norms.
[I]t is enough to satisfy the requirements of judicial
oversight of administrative action if the agency asserts
distinctions that, when fairly and sympathetically read in
the context of the entire opinion of the agency, reveal the
policies it is pursuing. So long as the policies can be
discerned, the court may exercise its proper function of
determining whether the agency's policies are consistent
with congressional directives. 1'2
Marshall noted that the Commission in the past had required
carriers to show that the new aggregate rates would be reasonable
for shippers who would be paying both the old line-haul rates and
the new separate charge. 10 3 The Commission had this time justified
its departure from its past practice on the ground that the inquiry
would be impractical, because the new charge would be added to
thousands of different line-haul rates, each of which would have
to be examined separately. Marshall answered, however, that that
argument did not fully explain the agency's action. The Commis-
sion's order would have the effect of shifting the burden of proof
from the carrier to the shipper in any subsequent proceeding to
determine whether a specific rate was reasonable. The agency had
not disclosed the policies behind that shift. °4 Nor did the Com-
101. Id. at 806-07 (quoting United States v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R.
R. Co., 294 U.S. 499, 511 (1935)) (other citations omitted).
102. Id. at 806-07, 809 (citations omitted).
103. Id. at 809-11.
104. Id. at 813-15.
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mission's opinion, "[e]ven giving [it] the most sympathetic reading
that we find possible,"' 15 reveal the policies behind the agency's
abandonment of its prior insistence on evaluating the fairness of
the change as applied to shippers who would stop buying the
separate service, but continue paying the old rates. 1°6 With those
policies nowhere set out, the Court could not judge their conform-
ity to the statute.107
The Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. opinion is striking. On
the one hand, Maishall's plurality opinion demonstrates stringent
rationality review. Even though the Commission explained why it
was departing from its past practice, the plurality nonetheless found
a remand necessary because, on a close examination, it found the
Commission's explanation logically inadequate. At the same time,
the opinion remained fixed on the lodestar of statutory fidelity: it
emphasized that the source of its refusal to pass over gaps in the
agency's reasoning was its duty to rule on the statutory legitimacy
of the agency's policies. 08
105. Id. at 817.
106. Id. at 815-17.
107. Id. at 822. Marshall went on to hold, however, that the mere fact that
the Commission's approval was insufficiently explained did not give the district
court power to suspend a carrier's implementation of the rate. Under the complex
railroad regulatory scheme, the railroad's right to implement the rate in the first
instance did not depend on Commission approval, and so the invalidity of the
agency's approval, without more, did not give the court power to enjoin the
carrier. Id. at 817-26.
108. This same linkage can be found in Marshall's dissenting opinion some
years later in Strycker's Bay Neighborhood Council v. Karlen, 444 U.S. 223
(1980). Strycker's Bay bore certain parallels to Overton Park: it involved a grass-
roots challenge to the Department of Housing and Urban Development's approval
of a New York City Planning Commission siting plan for the construction of
low-income housing. Plaintiffs argued that the Department's approval was im-
proper because the plan would concentrate large numbers of low-income public
housing units on a single crosstown axis. The local agency's report conceded that
the plan was "questionable" in terms of its "impact . . . on social fabric and
community structures," and that an alternative siting would be superior "[f]rom
the standpoint of social environmental impact." Id. at 230 (Marshall, J., dis-
senting). The local agency and the Department, however, rejected the alternate
plan because adopting it would delay construction by an additional two years.
For Marshall, those facts called for careful scrutiny of the agency's decision.
It was by no means clear, he argued, that the agency, consistently with the
"significant substantive goals" of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA),
42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370a, could treat the potential two-year delay as weightier
than the environmental disadvantages of the course it chose. 444 U.S. at 230
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting Vermont Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v.
Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 558 (1978)). The Secre-
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On a general level, Marshall's point is hard to argue with: a
court cannot review the statutory fidelity of an agency's action if
it declines any inquiry into rationality. An agency, after all, can
always characterize its decision as motivated by statutorily legiti-
mate concerns; the reviewing court will be impotent unless it has
the power to ask whether the factors that the agency purports to
have relied upon bear any relation to the decision it reached. "As
long as the court declines to examine the substance of the agency's
... explanation, an agency that dutifully jumps through the quasi-
procedural hoops will survive review regardless of its actual mo-
tives."' 19 Courts thus have used rationality review to smoke out
agency decisions motivated by considerations inimical to the leg-
islature's purposes.110
Rationality review, however, can be a powerful weapon in the
hands of lawyers seeking to overturn a complex agency decision.
A team of high-powered lawyers can always seize on some gap or
logical flaw in the intricacies of a difficult and complicated agency
choice."' The result is not so much that agency decisions are
commonly overturned," 2 as that courts possess the power to over-
tary, he noted, had conceded that it might be arbitrary for the Department to
give environmental values little or no weight; it was an open question, in light
of NEPA's requirements, whether the agency had given the environmental con-
sequences of its action the requisite "hard look." 444 U.S. at 231 (quoting
Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 410 n.21 (1976)).
Marshall therefore called for plenary review of the court of appeals' decision
vacating the agency action. The Court majority, however, saw the issues differ-
ently; it reversed summarily, without oral argument. According to the other
Justices, the lower court had improperly read NEPA to require that the agency
give environmental factors "determinative weight." 440 U.S. at 227 (quoting
Karlen v. Harris, 590 F.2d 39, 44 (1978)). This was error, the Court said; NEPA
should be read to impose only procedural requirements on the agency, with no
bearing on substantive decisionmaking.
109. Garland, Deregulation and Judicial Review, 98 HAzv. L. Rnv. 505,
554 (1985).
110. Id. at 553; see id. at 554-55 ("If a court finds the chosen course
unreasonable... it may [have] measured the outcome against the wrong motive.
The result may be perfectly rational in light of the agency's true ... motive.
The agency may have left that motive unstated, however, because it conflicts
with the statute."); Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HAv.
L. REv. 421, 469-71 (1987).
111. See Pierce, Unintended Effects, supra note 81, at 9-10, 26; Mashaw &
Harfst, supra note 59, at 282-83.
112. See Schuck & Elliott, To the Chevron Station: An Empirical Study of
Federal Administrative Law, 1990 DuKE L.J. 984, 1011 ("petitioners who chal-
lenge administrative decisions in court today confront a very low probability of
success").
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turn agency decisions regardless of whether those decisions are,
on the whole, well or badly reasoned." 3 That power can lead to
paralysis; agencies can become reluctant to take any action not
judicially bulletproof. 14 Moreover, the process reinforces a sys-
temic bias favoring those parties in a position to retain numerous
and expensive attorneys.
Rationality review, critics argue, has thus sometimes undercut
legislative goals by frustrating valid and important agency pro-
grams." 5 Nor should this be surprising; courts operate without
technical expertise, and attack only small pieces of big problems.
Their chances of understanding the full ramifications of the tech-
nical issues before them may be slim." 6
How vulnerable is Marshall's vision of judicial review to this
attack? Marshall emphasized that flaws or omissions in an agency's
113. Cf. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 59, at 283 (describing Chrysler Corp.
v. Department of Transp., 472 F.2d 659 (6th Cir. 1972), an opinion overturning
a National Highway and Traffic Safety Administration rule, as "announc[ing to
NHTSA] sotto voce that anything could happen on any issue").
114. See id. at 296-97, 315; Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law
and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. REv. 363, 391-93 (1986). Several commentators have
urged that this uncertainty discourages agencies from making policy through
rulemaking, where their decisions are particularly vulnerable to such attacks. See
Breyer, supra, at 391-93; Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 59, at 272-312; Pierce,
Unintended Effects, supra note 81, at 27.
115. See sources cited supra note 81; see also, e.g., Corrosion Proof Fittings
v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). According to Jerry Mashaw and David
Harfst, judicial review helped destroy the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
and Safety Act's program of revolutionizing auto safety requirements through
rulemaking. See Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 59. By requiring, in the name of
rationality and fairness, that the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration
prove in advance the reasonableness and ultimate success of its rules, courts
thwarted that agency's attempts to force industry to develop new safety technol-
ogies. One particular judicial remand, the authors suggest, has cost the nation
"tens of thousands of lives and millions of serious injuries" over the past twenty
years. 1d. at 295.
116. Accord Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 66-67 (D.C. Cir.) (Bazelon,
J., concurring), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976); Breyer, supra note 114, at
388-91.
Moreover, judicial review adds important delays to the regulatory process.
In a survey of cases decided in 1984-1985 in which courts remanded agency
decisions for further consideration, post-remand proceedings at the agency level
averaged about seventeen months. While almost two-thirds of the proceedings
were completed within a year, one in ten was still pending after almost five years.
Schuck & Elliott, supra note 112, at 1050. On judicial review as a source of
delay in the administrative process, see Breyer, supra note 114, at 383; Mashaw
& Harfst, supra note 59, at 295; Stewart, The Discontents of Legalism: Interest
Group Relations in Administrative Regulation, 1985 Wis. L. REv. 655, 678-82.
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reasoning are grounds for remand.117 Such flaws, he argued, are
danger signals; a reviewing court must pounce on them to prevent
ill-considered or impermissibly motivated agency action. Marshall's
arguments, I believe, are powerful. Yet his aggressive approach to
judicial review invites the objections just set out; it is difficult to
weigh the benefits of transparency, enforced rationality, and the
rule of law"8 against those objections in any rigorous manner.'1 9
Marshall was sensitive to the charge that judicial review of
agency action acts as a fundamentally conservative force, placing
legal roadblocks in the way of any agency attempt to change the
status quo. He was willing to defer, therefore, to agency technical
and predictive judgments regarding the need for regulation in cases
where the costs of ill-considered inaction might equal those of ill-
considered action. In Industrial Union Department v. American
Petroleum Institute (Benzene),'20 Marshall made a strong plea for
deference to an agency's predictive judgments when acting at the
frontiers of knowledge.
The Benzene case involved the Department of Labor's decision
to reduce the permissible level of workplace exposure to benzene
vapors from ten parts per million (ppm) to one ppm. The Secretary
of Labor had found that exposure to benzene increased workers'
risks of cancer, chromosomal damage, and a variety of blood
disorders. He found further that fewer lives would be lost at one
ppm than at ten.'2 1 No party challenged those findings. The
Secretary had also found, however, that it was impossible to say
exactly how many lives would be saved; no direct empirical data
was available on the carcinogenicity of benzene at levels below ten
ppm, and there was not sufficient information to construct even
a speculative dose-response curve.' = The best that could be said,
the Secretary concluded, was that the number of lives saved by
117. See supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text.
118. See, e.g., the testimonial of William Pedersen, then an EPA attorney,
in Pedersen, supra note 71, at 59-60.
119. Actual empirical evidence on the effect of judicial review is scarce;
most observers base their views on anecdotal evidence, and "different observers
evidently rely upon different anecdotes." Schuck & Elliott, supra note 112, at
987. Compare Sunstein, supra note 110, at 470-73 (the objections "have some
basis, but they are insufficient to justify abandonment of the hard-look doctrine")
with Pierce, Unintended Effects, supra note 81 (detriments grossly outweigh any
benefits).
120. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
121. Id. at 654 (plurality opinion).
122. Id. at 631-32.
1991]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
the new standard "may be appreciable," and that the costs of the
new standard were "justified in light of the hazards."' 1 3
A splintered Supreme Court overturned the agency's standard;
the various opinions covered more than 120 pages of U.S. Reports.
The plurality opinion began by finding an unwritten statutory
requirement that the Secretary not increase the stringency of his
workplace standards unless workplaces complying with existing
regulation presented a "significant risk of harm.' 1 It then vacated
the agency's standard on the ground that the Secretary had,
unsurprisingly, made no explicit findings with reference to this
newly minted test. 2' This tactic was problematic, in part because
the Secretary had explicitly stated that remedying the hazards of
the status quo justified new capital investments and estimated first-
year costs in excess of $450,000,000;126 it is hard to imagine how
he could have done so had he. not seen the averted risk as
"significant."' 127
Perhaps aware of this awkwardness, the plurality hinted that
the Secretary could not have supported a finding that benzene
risks at 10 ppm were significant. The opinion had indicated earlier
that the Secretary could not issue a standard unless he had "quan-
tified [the risk] sufficiently to enable [him] to characterize it as
significant in an understandable way";'2 that suggested that the
Secretary could never take action, since he had found the risk
benzene presented at ten ppm impossible to quantify. 29 The plu-
rality went on, however, to grant that it did not intend its require-
ment to be "a mathematical straitjacket," 130 and that the agency
need not support its finding "with anything approaching scientific
certainty."'' The plurality chided that the agency could, if it set
its mind to it, come up with numerical data on which to base "a
rational judgment about the relative significance of the risks.' ' 32
123. See id. at 665-66 (Powell, J., concurring in part and in the judgment);
id. at 704, 714 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
124. Id. at 642 (plurality opinion).
125. Id. at 662.
126. Id. at 628-29.
127. See Rodgers, supra note 15, at 304-05.
128. 448 U.S. at 646. Chief Justice Burger, a member of the plurality,
repeated that standard in his concurring opinion, although conceding that
"[p]recisely what this means is difficult to say." Id. at 663 (Burger, C.J.,
concurring).
129. Id. at 646 (plurality opinion).
130. Id. at 655.
131. Id. at 655-56.
132. Id. at 656-57 & n.64.
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The agency's failure, the plurality concluded, was in not doing
S0.133
Marshall dissented. The Occupational Safety and Health Act,
he pointed out, explicitly required the Secretary to set the standard
that "most adequately assures, to the extent feasible, on the basis
of the best available evidence, that no employee will suffer material
impairment of health or functional capacity" from toxic materials
such as benzene present in the workplace. 34 It was unchallenged
that employees would fall victim to cancer at ten ppm; for the
Court to require the Secretary to stay his hand simply because he
could not state the number of employees who would suffer pre-
sented a direct conflict with the statute. Such an approach, inimical
to Congress' desire that the Secretary proceed on the basis of "the
best available evidence" so that "the standard-setting process
would not be destroyed by the .uncertainty of scientific views,' 13'
ensured that American workers would remain subject to undisputed
and "continuing risk[s] of cancer and other fatal diseases, [with]
the Federal Government powerless to take protective action on
their behalf."' 136
Marshall's Benzene opinion cautioned against what it saw as
the plurality's "nearly de novo review of questions of fact and of
regulatory policy";137 it emphasized deference to the Secretary's
judgment that no quantification was possible.1 3 The Secretary's
inability to provide unassailable evidence in support of the more
stringent standard, Marshall argued, should not, without more,
cause that standard to be struck down; there is no reason for a
court to prefer nonregulation to regulation as such, and "inaction
has considerable costs of its own.' 139 Marshall's Benzene approach
is consistent with a theory of judicial review involving alert and
skeptical oversight of agency action, requiring clear and detailed
explanations of what the agency did and why, but nonetheless
allowing for uncertainty, and respecting the agency's job of setting
policy and making value choices in implementing the legislative
plan.14o
133. Id. at 659.
134. Id. at 707 (Marshall, J., dissenting) (quoting 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(5)
(1976)).
135. Id. at 693.
136. Id. at 690.
137. Id. at 695 n.9.
138. Id. at 705.
139. Id. at 722.
140. See Rodgers, supra note 15, at 309-18.
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That approach has garnered praise; 141 but it cannot lay to rest
the questions raised earlier regarding the costs of judicial review.
Powerful as Marshall's Benzene opinion is, it is a bit too neat to
argue that a judge need only bear in mind the precepts of that
opinion in order to realize all of the benefits of judicial review of
agency action and none of the disadvantages. Agencies have made
arguments, similar to those Marshall made in Benzene, in favor
of rules that under any analysis were pernicious. The Federal
Communications Commission (FCC) in Home Box Office v. FCC, 142
for example, invoked its predictive and technical expertise in
conditions of uncertainty, and warned of the risks of not regulat-
ing, in support of a rule whose main effect was for several years
to squelch the emergence of pay cable television channels. That
rule was properly struck down, 43 and indeed the FCC's decision
in that case was rather less carefully considered than the Labor
Department's decision in Benzene. Yet is there a reliable doctrinal
way to tell the two situations apart?
One approach, as Marshall suggested in Benzene, might be for
courts to be less aggressive when review is sought by or on behalf
of "institutions . . .by no means unable to protect themselves in
the political process."' 44 The idea, of course, is that intrusive
judicial review is less necessary when the aggrieved parties can
seek political redress. This representation-reinforcing approach is
consistent with the "fat cat" theory of the judicial role Marshall
sometimes expressed to his clerks: although a judge should uphold
valid legal arguments pressed by a 'fat cat" litigant, he explained,
there is no need for the judge to get too excited about them.
But Marshall recognized, I think, that we cannot avoid the
tension between the need for intrusive judicial review and the
disadvantages of that review. 45 Keeping administrators within their
141. See id. (approvingly associating Marshall's opinion with "muddling
through" theory of agency decisionmaking).
Professor Diver has characterized Marshall's Benzene opinion as consistent
with an "incrementalist" approach to review that has much in common with
Professor Rodgers' model. In contrast to Professor Rodgers, though, Professor
Diver associates the incrementalist paradigm with a generally lenient approach to
review. See Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 HARv. L.
REv. 393 (1981). But see Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 59, at 316 (there is no
coherent way to use the model to shape a lenient approach to review).
142. 567 F.2d 9 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 829 (1977).
143. See Weinberg, supra note 81, at 692-701.
144. Benzene, 448 U.S. at 695 n.9.
145. See Breyer, supra note 114, at 394-95.
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delegated authority is an essential element of the rule of law; strict
rationality review is the only meaningful way to do it. Much post-
New Deal regulatory legislation calls for "[1]arge-scale rearrange-
ment of entitlements by general rules, promulgated by appointive
agencies having vague mandates"; 146 our common-law heritage,
and our basic views of justice, demand judicial oversight of such
an enterprise. In undertaking that effort, judges will deliver an
imperfect product. The judicial review game, though, is still the
only one in town.
IV. REVIEW OF ADMINISTRATIVE STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
In cases placing in question the fidelity of agency statutory
interpretations to legislative directives, Marshall wrote opinions
both supporting and rejecting agency positions. In the Benzene 47
case, for example, Marshall, writing for four Justices, championed
the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of the Occupational Safety
and Health Act; he accused the plurality of making up its "sig-
nificant risk" requirement out of whole cloth because of its
unwillingness to accept the policy choices Congress embodied in
the Act.' 4s In Chemical Manufacturers Association v. National
Resources Defense Council, Inc.,149 Marshall again dissented, again
writing for four Justices but this time rejecting the agency position.
While the Court majority ruled that the EPA could, consistently
with the Clean Water Act, 150 offer certain variances from the
requirements of that statute,' Marshall argued that Congress had
explicitly and intentionally forbidden the agency to grant those
variances.' 52
146. Mashaw & Harfst, supra note 59, at 314.
147. 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
148. [Tjoday's decision represents a usurpation of decisionmaking au-
thority that has been exercised by and properly belongs with Congress
and its authorized representatives. The plurality's construction has no
support in the statute's language, structure, or legislative history. The
threshold finding that the plurality requires is the plurality's own inven-
tion. It bears no relationship to the acts or intentions of Congress, and
it can be understood only as reflecting the personal views of the plurality
as to the proper allocation of resources for safety in the American
workplace.
448 U.S. at 712-13 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
149. 470 U.S. 116 (1985).
150. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988).
151. 470 U.S. at 134.
152. Id. at 138-52 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
1991]
THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
A year later, Marshall, again writing for four Justices, dissented'
from a Court opinion upholding the Secretary of Commerce's
understanding of the Pelly5  and Packwood5 4 Amendments in
Japan Whaling Association v. American Cetacean Society.'55 He
argued with considerable force that the Secretary had ignored plain
statutory language and legislative intent because of his unwilling-
ness to implement the choice Congress had made. 156 Finally, three
years ago, Marshall dissented in Public Employees Retirement
System v. Betts, 57 in which the majority rejected an Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission interpretation of the Age Dis-
crimination in Employment Act'58 as inconsistent with "the plain
language of the statute."' 15 9 Marshall, defending the agency's view,
pointed out that the majority's prefered reading was at least as
inconsistent with the statutory language, and was wholly unmoored
from the statute's legislative history and purposes. 16°
These four cases have several things in common.' 61 Marshall
was on the losing side in all of them. His opinions in all of them
153. 22 U.S.C. § 1978 (1988).
154. 16 U.S.C. § 1821 (1988).
155. 478 U.S. 221 (1986).
156. Id. at 241-50 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
157. 492 U.S. 158 (1989).
158. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-634 (1988), amended by 29 U.S.C. §§ 623-631 (1988
& Supp. 1989).
159. 492 U.S. at 171.
160. Id. at 185-91 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Marshall's views on the importance of the judicial role in ensuring agency
fidelity to the governing statute are also revealed in Heckler v. Day, 467 U.S.
104 (1984), in which the Court majority reversed a district court order setting
state-wide deadlines for Health and Human Services processing of disability
claims. Marshall, dissenting, described the district court as properly and reason-
ably requiring the agency to obey its statutory responsibilities. Id. at 121-37; see
also FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 604 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting) (Federal Communications Commission interpretation of the Commu-
nications Act ignored duty imposed on agency by that statute); Miller v. Youakim,
440 U.S. 125 (1979) (Marshall, J.) (state agency's definition of "foster family
home" within meaning of federal AFDC statute inconsistent with statutory
language, structure, and legislative history); cf. Mullins Coal Co. v. Director,
Office of Workers' Compensation Programs, 484 U.S. 135, 161 (1987) (Marshall,
J., dissenting) (Department of Labor's rules concerning black lung benefits
inconsistent with its own regulations).
161. Benzene, Chemical Manufacturers, and Japan Whaling Association are
the only non-unanimous Supreme Court cases I am aware of, challenging federal
agency action and presenting a question of "pure" interpretation of the agency's
governing statute, in which Marshall wrote an opinion. I have added Betts to
the list, notwithstanding that plaintiff was not challenging agency action in the
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manifest a commitment to vindicating Congress' actual intent.
And, at least in the eyes of this observer, Marshall has the better
of the argument in all four. 62 Without regard to whether Marshall
was attacking or defending the agency, his dissents seem more
nearly to capture what Congress intended and expressed, while the
prevailing opinions seem rather more creatively to capture what
their authors believed it would have been convenient for Congress
to have intended and expressed. 16
This suggests an irony in Marshall's vision of searching judicial
scrutiny of agencies' compliance with statutes. The Court eagerly
embraced that vision in two cases where Marshall believed the
agencies' actions to be well supported;'6 it espoused a philosophy
of deference in two cases where Marshall believed the agencies to
be violating their mandates.165 It is hardly clear that the Court, in
conventional sense (a former state employee filed suit against the state agency
providing her with retirement benefits), because it turns so prominently on the
question of the appropriate degree of deference due to the EEOC's interpretation
of the relevant statute.
I have omitted from this list cases that rest on challenges to the rationality
of the agency's actions (as opposed to its statutory interpretations), and cases
such as FCC v. WNCN Listeners Guild, 450 U.S. 582, 612 (1981) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting), involving intertwined arguments that agency action was both an
unreasonable departure from earlier policies and inconsistent with the agency's
statutory obligations. While the Benzene case raises important rationality issues,
its statutory-interpretation issue was a separate crucial question in the case.
162. The weakest of the four in this respect is Betts; the fragmentary
legislative history in that case can be read to support either side. It is worth
noting, though, that all five courts of appeals that considered the Betts issue, as
well as a Solicitor General's office not noted for its liberal interpretations of the
civil rights laws, agreed with Marshall.
The other three are much stronger cases for Marshall's position. In Benzene,
indeed, a majority of the Court agreed with Marshall that there was nothing in
the statute or its legislative history contravening the agency's interpretation.
Justice Rehnquist, however, decided that a key statutory provision, while consis-
tent with Marshall's view, could not be used to support the agency action because
it was unconstitutional: the legislative history gave so little guidance as to the
statute's meaning as to render it invalid under the nondelegation doctrine. 448
U.S. at 680-88 (Rehnquist, J., concurring in the judgment).
163. At least one academic observer, thus, has expressed the view that the
result in Benzene was "quite sensible" policy, and that the agency's intended
action was "overzealous." Sunstein, On the Costs and Benefits of Aggressive
Judicial Review of Agency Action, 1989 DuKE L.J. 522, 529. That may be so;
Marshall, though, would answer that rethinking the statute's wisdom is not an
appropriate part of statutory interpretation.
164. See supra notes 147-48, 157-60 and accompanying text.
165. See supra notes 149-56 and accompanying text.
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essaying its review, was more responsive to the legislative mandate
than the agencies had been in the first instance. Although one can
hardly draw reliable generalizations from four cases, the incongru-
ity prompts the question raised in Part II of this article: are courts
undertaking judicial review of agency statutory interpretations
likely to reach sufficiently good results to make that review a good
thing? Or will judicial review, in the long run, be counterproduc-
tive, an expensive way of reaching essentially random results? 1
Marshall's position was firmly on the side of judicial review.
To understand the evolution of that issue, it is necessary to examine
the ways in which the Court approached judicial review of agency
statutory interpretations over the years. In Overton Park,67 when
the Court considered the meaning of the Department of Trans-
portation Act and the Federal-Aid Highway Act, Marshall had
before him no agency interpretation, promulgated outside of the
press of litigation, setting forth the Department's view as to the
proper understanding of the statutes. Had there been such an
interpretation, there was case law both supporting and rejecting
the notion that the Court should defer to the agency's position. 68
In some earlier cases, the Court had given the agency's view no
weight whatsoever; 69 in others, it had instructed lower courts to
take from the "experience and informed judgment" of the agency
whatever guidance they felt was justified. 70 In still other cases,
the Court had described the definition of statutory terms as part
166. See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
167. 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
168. Compare Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166 (1970) ("since the only
or principal dispute relates to the meaning of a statutory term, the controversy
must ultimately be resolved, not on the basis of matters within the special
competence of the [agency], but by judicial application of canons of statutory
construction") with Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16 (1965) ("[w]hen faced with
a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the
interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its admin-
istration."). See generally Diver, supra note 85, at 549-67, from which these
quotations are taken.
169. See, e.g., FCC v. RCA Communications, Inc., 346 U.S. 86, 91 (1953).
The plurality took the same approach in Benzene; it stated in a single
sentence, buried in the bottom of a footnote seven-eighths of the way through
its opinion, that it "decline[d] to defer" to the agency's interpretation. 448 U.S.
at 651 n.58.
170. See Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). The Court stated:
"The weight of [the agency's] judgment in a particular case will depend upon
the thoroughness evident in its consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its
consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and all those factors which
give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control." Id. at 140.
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of "the usual administrative routine" of the agency, not to be
overturned by a court without reasonable basisY'
The Court attempted to impose some order on that chaos in
the landmark case of Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources De-
fense Council. 72 The Chevron opinion announced that when a
court reviews an agency's construction of its governing statute,
and "Congress has [not] directly spoken to the precise question at
issue," 73 the court must uphold the agency's view so long as it is
"reasonable."' ' 74 Under Chevron, if Congress has not spoken to
the exact point at issue, considerations of policy, purpose, or
structure are to play little role. Courts have no authority "to force
recalcitrant agencies to implement more vigorously the policies that
animated Congress.' ' 75 Chevron restricted judicial power to reject
agency interpretations on the grounds of infidelity to general
statutory purposes, as opposed to specific contrary intent; it thereby
invalidated "what had been a rather common method of over-
turning agency interpretations.' '176
Marshall did not participate in Chevron; his first opportunity
to speak to its holding came eight months later, in Chemical
Manufacturers Association v. NRDC.177 The majority reaffirmed
the Chevron rule 78 and upheld the EPA's practice of offering
certain Clean Water Act variances. The Court had to defer to the
agency interpretation, it concluded, because the language and
legislative history of the statute did not "evince an unambiguous
congressional intention to forbid" the specific course the agency
chose. 79 Marshall dissented, arguing that Congress had explicitly
intended, in a 1979 amendment to the statute, to bar the challenged
practice.
Language in Marshall's opinion may reveal his approach to
the deference question.8 0 In discussing the level of deference due
171. See NLRB v. Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 130-31 (1944).
172. 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
173. Id. at 842.
174. Id. at 842-45.
175. Starr, Judicial Review in the Post-Chevron Era, 3 YALE J. ON RO.
283, 295 (1986).
176. Id. at 295 n.93 (citing four of the cases listed infra note 182).
177. 470 U.S. 116 (1985); see supra notes 149-52 and accompanying text.
178. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 112, at 991, 1025-26. The authors
characterize Chemical Manufacturers as "particularly significant" for its role in
the evolution of the Chevron doctrine. Id.
179. 470 U.S. at 129.
180. The Chevron holding did not control the debate in Chemical Manufac-
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the agency, Marshall explained, "the courts are the final authorities
on issues of statutory construction ... [and] must reject admin-
istrative constructions of the statute . . . that are inconsistent with
the statutory mandate or that frustrate the policy that Congress
sought to implement."'' He then cited a string of cases in which
the Court had invalidated agency interpretations as being incon-
sistent with statutory policies, purposes or structure.1 2
This is subtly, but importantly, different from the approach
of Chevron: in .Chevron, the Court largely denied judicial power
to overturn agency interpretations on such grounds. Marshall, by
contrast, was unwilling to forswear a role for judges in safeguard-
ing congressional policy. Where congressional language offered no
turers, for Marshall argued that the EPA's interpretation was inconsistent with
an explicit legislative choice. The majority, for its part, considered and rejected
the argument that the variances would frustrate statutory goals. Marshall thus
stated that his "disagreement with the Court [did] not center on its reading of
Chevron." 470 U.S. at 152 (Marshall, J., dissenting). His differences regarding
Chevron are nonetheless, I think, significant.
181. 470 U.S. at 151 (emphasis added) (quoting Federal Election Comm'n
v. Democratic Senatorial Campaign Comm., 454 U.S. 27, 31-32 (1981)). The
Court had quoted the same language in Securities Indus. Ass'n v. Board of
Governors, 468 U.S. 137 (1984), an earlier post-Chevron case. That majority
opinion, though, is notable for its failure to mention Chevron at all; it approved
the agency's interpretation as supported by the statutory language and "fully
consistent with the Act's purposes." Id. at 140.
182. 470 U.S. at 151. In SEC v. Sloan, 436 U.S. 103 (1978), the Court
rejected the agency's interpretation of the Securities Exchange Act, which it
characterized as "not an impossible reading of the statute [but] not the most
natural or logical one." Id. at 111. The structure of the Act and the purposes
of the relevant provision, the Court held, cut against the agency's view. Id. at
112-23. In FMC v. Seatrain Lines, 411 U.S. 726 (1973), Marshall's opinion for
a unanimous Court rejected the agency's interpretation of ambiguous statutory
language in light of the policies and structure of the statute. In Volkswagenwerk
Aktiengesellschaft v. FMC, 390 U.S. 261 (1968), the Court rejected the agency's
understanding of the Shipping Act, finding the agency's reading of the statutory
language "extremely narrow" and inconsistent with the policies and structure of
the statute. Id. at 273. In NLRB v. Brown, 380 U.S. 278 (1965), the Court
rejected the Board's application of the unfair labor practice provisions of the
NLRA; the Court held that the Board had improperly struck the "balance ...
between conflicting interests." Id. at 292. In Social Security Board v. Nierotko,
327 U.S. 358 (1945), the Court struck down the agency's interpretation of the
Social Security Act as inconsistent with statutory policies and sound reasoning.
In Burnet v. Chicago Portrait Co., 285 U.S. 1 (1932), the Court rejected the
administrative interpretation of ambiguous statutory language in light of "the
purpose of the statute." Id. at 7. In Webster v. Luther, 163 U.S. 331, 342








The Chevron rigid rule of deference seems problematic. Why
should a court not strike down an agency statutory interpretation
that, in its view, disserves the policies of the underlying statute?'
One good reason for the court to stay its hand might be that
Congress intended the agency, not the court, to exercise the relevant
law-making authority."6 The Chevron holding is not limited, how-
ever, to such cases; the Court made clear that its rule applies
regardless of whether Congress explicitly chose to give the agency
that power.8 7 Deference to Congress' allocation of interpretive
authority, thus, does not explain the Court's unswerving rule that
a court, in the absence of legislative attention to the specific issue,
must always defer to a "reasonable" agency interpretation. It is
hard to justify the view that any gap in a statutory scheme
183. Marshall later relied on Chevron in some of his own opinions, including
United States v. City of Fulton, 475 U.S. 657 (1986). In City of Fulton, though,
Marshall emphasized that the statutory language and legislative history provided
no guidance, and that various policies underlying the statute pointed in conflicting
directions; in such a case, it could not be said that the agency's interpretation
was inconsistent with the statute.
184. Solicitor General Starr has characterized Marshall in Chemical Manu-facturers Association as going "to some length to point out that [his] disagreement
with the majority did not reflect a disagreement either with Chevron or with the
majority's reading of that case." Starr, supra note 175, at 289. That is overstated.
Marshall made clear that under any reasonable view of Chevron, his understanding
of the statute and its legislative history counseled reversal, while the majority's
counseled affirmance. See supra note 180. That is not to say, though, that he
had no disagreement with the majority's reading of Chevron; his opinion, as I
discuss in the text, suggests that he did.
185. See Sunstein, Deregulation and the Courts, 5 J. Por.'Y ANALi. & Momr.
517, 529 (1986).
186. See, e.g., Anthony, Which Agency Interpretations Should Bind Citizens
and the Courts?, 7 YALE J. oN REG. 1 (1990); Breyer, supra note 114, at 369-
70; Monaghan, Marbury and the Administrative State, 83 CoLm. L. REv. 1
(1983); Starr, supra note 175, at 308-09.
187. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865, where the Court stated: "Perhaps
[Congress] consciously desired the Administrator to strike the balance... perhaps
it simply did not consider the question.... For judicial purposes, it matters not
which of these things occurred." But see Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 110 S. Ct.
1384, 1390 (1990) (Marshall, J.) (court need not defer to agency interpretation
of a statute it does not administer, because "precondition to deference under
Chevron is a congressional delegation of administrative authority"). Cf. Pauley
v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 111 S. Ct. 2524, 2534 (1991) (relevant statutory
provision "cannot be read except as a delegation of interpretive authority" to
the agency).
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manifests an "implicit" congressional "delegation to [the]
agency."' 8 Congress, if it thought at all about the allocation of
interpretive authority in a particular case, may well have contem-
plated that the courts would resolve any ambiguity.'8 9
Another good reason for judges to defer to agency interpre-
tations might be that the agency knows more about the relevant
area of law than does the court.190 But this situation too does not
necessarily arise in every case of statutory interpretation; in some
cases the agency may have no relevant expertise.19' The Court's
blanket rule, thus, again seems incompletely justified. Moreover,
any advantages the agency may have in divining congressional
intent' 92 and "elucidat[ing] the understanding of a statute's
audience' '1 93 seem almost meaningless in light of the agency's lack
of incentive to interpret the statute in accordance with the inten-
tions of its enactors; the agency's strong interest lies instead in
interpreting the statute in whatever manner best suits its policy
goals. 194
A defender of Chevron might argue that congressional statutes
typically reflect a variety of conflicting policies, and that any
interpretation will serve some but disserve others; because the
interpretive job is one of "reconciling conflicting policies,' ' ' 95 a
188. Id. at 844.
189. See Breyer, supra note 114, at 376. Judge Breyer, indeed, argues that
"[flor the most part courts have used 'legislative intent to delegate the law-
interpreting function' as a kind of legal fiction.. .. to decide whether it 'makes
sense,' in terms of the need for fair and efficient administration of that statute
in light of its substantive purpose," to defer to the agency's interpretation. Id.
at 370. That approach, he argues, is superior to Chevron's.
190. See id. at 368-69; Diver, supra note 85, at 574-78.
191. See Breyer, supra note 114, at 373-78.
192. See Diver, supra note 85, at 574-75; Starr, supra note 175, at 309-10.
193. Diver, supra note 85, at 576. An agency also may be better situated to
guess the real-world consequences of various statutory interpretations. Id. at 577-
78.
194. Professor Diver concedes that "the danger that self-interest will infect
the agency's reading of its statute is pronounced." Id. at 582. He finds, however,
that one can draw no clear conclusion from the factors discussed in text favoring
either deference or independent review. He ultimately concludes that deference is
usually appropriate, because leaving interpretive authority with the agency fosters
geographic uniformity, allows healthy administrative changes of policy, makes it
easier for agencies to adopt statutory readings that reinforce other agency policies,
allows interpretive decisions to be made with enforcement considerations in mind,
and encourages compliance with agency rulings by making them seem more final.
Id. at 585-92; see also Sunstein, Law and Administration After Chevron, 90
CoLu m. L. Rnv. 2071, 2087-91 (1990).
195. Chevron, 467 U.S. 837, 865.
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variety of interpretations will likely be consistent with the statute.
Thus, it will often be wrong for a court to reject an agency
interpretation simply because the court believes that the agency's
choice disserves a policy underlying the statute; that policy is likely
to be only one of a set of conflicting legislative goals and con-
cerns. 96 But the question can be raised once again: why the blanket
rule? Even in the absence of such a rule, a perceptive judge will
recognize conflicting statutory policies when she sees them, and
will not incorrectly elevate one over the rest. The effect of the
blanket rule on such a judge is only to prevent her from invali-
dating agency interpretations in other cases where it is in fact
appropriate to do so. 1'
The Court's approach, thus, seems to make the most sense as
a prophylactic rule. If all judges were as perceptive as themselves,
the Chevron Justices may have felt, there would be no need for a
blanket rule; even without the rule, good judges would not seek
to import their own "personal policy preferences"' 9 into the
statutory command. But because some judges may make improper
use of statutory policies, judicial review of agency statutory inter-
pretations can be counterproductive: the Chevron straightjacket
was designed to check that. 99 Chevron can thus be seen as a
doctrinal embodiment of the argument raised earlier in this article °
that we should limit judicial review because otherwise courts un-
dertaking such review will make wrong decisions2 °1
196. See Starr, supra note 175, at 294-95.
197. It might be argued that the Chevron rule will not inappropriately
prevent judges from overturning bad agency interpretations, because an agency
decision will not be "reasonable" if it contravenes clear statutory policies. If
Chevron allows courts to give statutory policies such weight, though, it is not
clear what content it has. It is hardly controversial that judges should uphold
otherwise appropriate agency decisions where they can find neither specific nor
general legislative intent to the contrary.
198. 467 U.S. at 865.
199. See Sunstein, supra note 110, at 468 n.217.
200. See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
201. One could alternatively argue that since Congress commonly intends
agencies to exercise interpretive authority, and agencies commonly are more
competent to determine the meaning of statutory language than are courts, a
blanket rule of deference is more cost-effective than a system under which courts
have to decide in each case whether to defer. After all, one can rarely find clear
evidence of how Congress wished to allocate interpretive authority in a specific
case, see Diver, supra note 85, at 570, and a blanket rule of deference will save
money, both by simplifying the judicial task and by discouraging petitions for
review. Id. at 572-73; see also Sunstein, supra note 194, at 2097 ("an ad hoc
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Since 1984, Chevron has ascended to the status of a landmark
case. Marshall's softer reformulation in his Chemical Manufactur-
ers Association dissent received little attention. It is by no means
clear, though, that the Chevron rule has improved the quality of
judicial review. On the one hand, by the very nature of a prophy-
lactic rule, Chevron presumably has led courts to affirm some
agency interpretations that, except for adherence to the rule,
properly would have been reversed. On the other hand, the Chev-
ron rule was insufficient to cause the Court to support the agency
in Betts, just as the deference principle was insufficient in Benzene;
both cases were decided-incorrectly, according to Marshall-on
the putative ground that the agency interpretations were inconsis-
tent with the plain language of the relevant statutes. 2 2 The Chevron
approach, thus, has deprived reviewing courts of interpretive tools
while only incompletely (if at all) achieving its goal of protecting
valid agency interpretations. 20 3
inquiry into administrative competence would be an exceedingly poor way to
handle the question whether Chevron applies"). But see Breyer, supra note 114,
at 380 ("There is no particular reason to believe that automatically accepting the
agency's interpretation of a statute would simplify, or make easier, the judge's
task."). The appeal to bright-line simplicity has considerable force. In my view,
however, the Chevron rule goes sufficiently to the heart of American separation
of powers that it should be upheld only because it improves the quality of judges'
decisions in some meaningful sense, not because it allows judges to reach inferior
results more cheaply.
202. The Supreme Court has found itself quite able, notwithstanding Chev-
ron, to overturn agency interpretations by characterizing them as inconsistent
with unambiguous statutory language or explicit congressional decisions. See,
e.g., Presley v. Etowah County Comm'n, 60 U.S.L.W. 4135 (U.S. Jan. 27,
1992); Dole v. United Steelworkers, 494 U.S. 26 (1990); Sullivan v. Zebley, 493
U.S. 521 (1990); Pittston Coal Group v. Sebben, 488 U.S. 105 (1988). This lends
support to the argument that the language of deference is simply a smokescreen.
See generally Rodgers, supra note 15, at 302 (voicing "the suspicion ... that
the grand synthesizing principle that tells us whether the court will dig deeply or
bow cursorily depends exclusively on whether the judge agrees with the result of
the administrative decision"); Schuck, The Transformation of Immigration Law,
84 COLUM. L. REv. 1, 15 (1984) ("Judicial rhetoric about deference to the
'political branches' and to administrative expertise, of course, is commonplace.
Such talk is a venerable aspect of the courts' protective coloration, and should
not be taken too seriously."), quoted in Diver, supra note 85, at 564 n.113;
Shapiro, supra note 85, at 479 n.38 ("One should not pretend to be fooled by
the language of Chevron ... obviously the court does not defer to the agency.
It simply agrees that the regulatory policy adopted by the agency is a good
one.").
203. Chevron has had an important atmospheric effect on the lower courts,
at least temporarily increasing affirmances of agency decisions and decreasing
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Marshall's opinions in this area ultimately wrestled with a basic
contradiction in judicial review of agency action. Judicial review
of agencies' statutory interpretations is necessary because of agen-
cies' bias, pursuit of their own agendas, and result-orientation;
Overton Park stands as authority for that. That same judicial
review can be problematic, though, as demonstrated by Marshall's
consistent position in dissent: the Court itself is not free from
bias, pursuit of Justices' own agendas, and result-orientation.
Marshall opposed any suggestion that that tension should lessen
the Court's commitment to judicial review as an institution. Rather,
his opinions suggest, we simply are stuck with the contradiction. 2°4
We surely have found no way around it.
V. THE BouNDs oF REvIEw
A final question raised by Overton Parko5 concerns the bounds
of reviewability. Marshall made clear in his later opinions that the
nature of the congressional scheme and the demands of the ad-
ministrative process impose important limits on the reviewability
of agency action. 206 Thus, in Briscoe v. Bell,2w Marshall rejected
remands. See Schuck & Elliott, supra note 112, at 1029-41. It is possible to argue
that the case has had a salutary effect on the lower courts regardless of its
application in the Supreme Court. The mere fact that Chevron has increased
affirmances of agency decisionmaking, though, does not speak to whether those
decisions ought to have been affirmed.
204. See generally Frug, supra note 88.
205. Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
206. In McGee v. United States, 402 U.S. 479 (1971), Marshall's opinion
for the Court relied on the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies to
bar review. The opinion held that a defendant who had not sought to build a
record before the draft board on whether he should receive either ministerial
student or conscientious objector status, and had not given the agency a fair
opportunity to pass on those factual issues, could not thereafter challenge his I-
A classification when charged with refusal to submit to draft induction. Id. at
479. Marshall distinguished his own majority opinion in McKart v. United States,
395 U.S. 185 (1969), holding that a criminal defendant could raise the classifi-
cation issue notwithstanding having failed to seek an internal administrative
appeal of the draft board's classification decision, given that defendant had built
the necessary administrative record and that the substantive issue he raised was
wholly one of statutory interpretation. Id. at 484-86. Cf. Fein v. Selective Serv.
Sys. Local Bd. No. 7, 405 U.S. 365, 387 (1972) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (pre-
induction review should be available to a person challenging constitutionality of
draft board decisionmaking process).
For another holding by Marshall limiting the court's powers on review, see
Atchison, Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. v. Wichita Bd. of Trade, 412 U.S. 800, 817-
26 (plurality opinion), discussed supra note 108.
207. 432 U.S. 404 (1977).
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the District of Columbia Circuit's view that it had inherent power,
even in the face of an explicit congressional bar, to review gov-
ernment decisions said to be "on their face ... plainly in excess
of statutory authority." 20 Congress, Marshall explained, was the
source of the review power; in the absence of any constitutional
question, the courts had no authority to intervene where the
legislature forbade them to.209
After Overton Park, however, Marshall increasingly found
himself in dissent from Supreme Court rulings rejecting judicial
review for regulatory beneficiaries, or upholding obstacles to such
review. In Ortwein v. Schwab,210 the Court majority summarily
dismissed the argument that a state violates due process when it
imposes a filing fee beyond the reach of indigent claimants as a
precondition to judicial review of administrative decisions reducing
welfare benefits. 211 Marshall dissented; he queried whether the
Constitution permits the state to eliminate the judicial forum in
that manner when it deprives welfare recipients of protected prop-
erty interests.212
In Morris v. Gressette,2 13 the Court majority denied any judicial
review of the Attorney General's failure to object, under the Voting
Rights Act, to a state's change in its voting laws. 21 4 While ac-
knowledging that review should be available under the APA unless
there is "persuasive reason to believe ' 215 that Congress meant to
preclude it, the Court found in the Voting Rights Act an unex-
pressed legislative desire to bar review so as not to "unduly delay
the implementation of validly enacted, nondiscriminatory state
legislation. ' 216 Marshall again dissented; "[t]he conclusion in [Bris-
coe v. Bell] that review is precluded when Congress says so," he
retorted, "does not support the conclusion that review is also
precluded when Congress has not said S0. ' 217 Noting that the
208. Id. at 408.
209. Id. at 409.
210. 410 U.S. 656 (1973).
211. Id. at 661.
212. Id. at 665-66.
213. 432 U.S. 491 (1977).
214. Id. at 501-03.
215. Id. at 501 (citing, inter alia, Overton Park, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971),
which itself quoted Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 141 (1967), for the
proposition that review could not be cut off absent "clear and convincing
evidence" that Congress so intended).
216. 432 U.S. at 503.
217. Id. at 510 n.3 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Attorney General had undisputedly failed to carry out his statutory
duty to object to voting-law changes that he believed violated the
Act 2 18 Marshall found it "simply implausible that Congress ...
intended to allow the Act's primary enforcement mechanism to be
vitiated at the whim of an Attorney General." 219
In Heckler v. Chaney,20 finally, Marshall-and the Court-
came full circle to the question, first discussed by the Court in
Overton Park, of the scope of the statutory exemption for actions
"committed to agency discretion." The facts of Chaney were
unusual, and a bit macabre; respondent death row inmates con-
tended that the states' use of lethal injection drugs for executions
violated the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act,21 and had
requested the Food and Drug Administration (FDA) to take en-
forcement action to ensure that the drugs would not be used.2
The FDA declined to do so. It found it unclear whether it had
jurisdiction over the drugs at all; and, in any event, it explained,
its enforcement resources were limited, and use of the drugs in
executions did not present "a serious danger to the public health." M
The Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit reversed; it found the
FDA's decision irrational in light of agency precedents and a prior
agency statement relating to unapproved uses of approved drugs. n 4
The Supreme Court reversed, upholding the agency action;2
the FDA's decision was immune from review, Justice Rehnquist
explained, because it was "committed to agency discretion. ' 2 6
218. Id. at 513-14 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
219. Id. at 508 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
220. 470 U.S. 821 (1985).
221. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-392 (Supp. 1985).
222. 470 U.S. at 823. Plaintiffs argued first that use of the drugs for
executions violated 21 U.S.C. § 352(0 (1982) because the drugs were not distrib-
uted with "adequate directions for use" in order to induce the quick and painless
death intended. They argued further that the FDA was required to approve the
drugs as "safe" and "effective" for execution under 21 U.S.C. § 355. They
pointed out that the agency had applied § 355 in the analogous case of drugs
used to kill animals (although that case involved drugs marketed by the manu-
facturer solely for that purpose, rather than, as in this case, drugs already
approved and marketed for an unrelated purpose). See 470 U.S. at 826-27. The
agency would not be able to find that the drugs met § 355's requirements, the
inmates argued, because death by lethal injection was commonly slow and
excruciating. 470 U.S. at 823-24.
223. 470 U.S. at 824-25.
224. See id. at 827.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 834-35; see 5 U.S.C. § 701(a)(2) (1982). The Court did not reach
the "thorny" question whether the FDA would have had statutory authority to
take action against the drugs had it chosen to do so. 470 U.S. at 826-27.
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Citing Overton Park, Rehnquist started with the principle that the
APA bars review "if the statute is drawn so that a court would
have no meaningful standard against which to judge the agency's
exercise of discretion."227 He continued, though, that when the
challenge is to an agency's refusal to take enforcement action,
special rules apply-and "the presumption is that judicial review
is not available." m In general, he explained, "an agency's decision
not to prosecute or enforce, whether through civil or criminal
process, is . . . committed to an agency's absolute discretion." 229
That principle, he continued, flows from the fact that the typical
nonenforcement decision is polycentric, uniquely within agency
expertise, noncoercive, and unfocused, as well as from the Framers'
decision to direct the President, rather than the courts, to "take
Care that the laws be faithfully executed." z 0
After setting out those factors, Rehnquist nonetheless conceded
that the ultimate question under § 701(a)(2) of the APA is whether
"the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the agency to
follow in exercising its enforcement powers .... Congress may
limit an agency's exercise of enforcement power if it wishes, either
by setting substantive priorities, or by otherwise circumscribing an
agency's power to discriminate among issues or cases it will pur-
sue."'21 This, of course, is the "no law to apply" standard of
Overton Park. Rehnquist accordingly "turn[ed] to the FDCA to
determine whether Congress has provided us with.. . meaningful
standards for defining the limits of [agency enforcement] discre-
tion. '232 He ultimately concluded that neither the statute nor any
prior agency pronouncement provided any binding law circum-
scribing the FDA's discretion,23 and that the court of appeals
therefore erred in undertaking review.2 4
227. 470 U.S. at 830.
228. Id. at 831.
229. Id.
230. Id. at 831-32 (quoting U.S. CoNsT. art. II, cl. 3).
231. Id. at 833.
232. Id. at 834.
233. Id. at 835-37. This portion of Rehnquist's analysis seems to assume
that review should be available if the nonenforcement decision violated agency
regulations. Id. The opinion also suggests that review should be available where
the agency bases its nonenforcement decision "solely on the belief that it lacks
jurisdiction .... [or if] the agency has 'consciously and expressly adopted a
general policy' that is so extreme as to amount to an abdication of its statutory
responsibilities." Id. at 833 n.4 (quoting Adams v. Richardson, 480 F.2d 1159,
1162 (D.C. Cir. 1973)). The opinion reserves the case where nonenforcement is
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The effect of Justice Rehnquist's opinion is unclear. Given the
opinion's ultimate reliance on the presence or absence of law
constraining the agency's choice, what role does the presumption
against review play? Ultimately, it appears simply to be a thumb
on the scales, and a warning to lower courts to be stingy when
faced with claims for review of nonenforcement decisions.23 Is it
justified? Marshall, the only member of the Court not joining the
majority opinion, said no.
In his opinion concurring in the judgment, Marshall lambasted
the Rehnquist presumption, which he characterized as "create[d]
out of whole cloth" and "fundamentally at odds with rule-of-law
principles firmly embedded in our jurisprudence.""' 6
[The sine qua non of the APA was to alter inherited
judicial reluctance to constrain the exercise of discretionary
administrative power-to rationalize and make fairer the
exercise of such discretion .... Judicial review is available
under the APA . . . precisely so that agencies, whether in
rulemaking, adjudicating, acting or failing to act, do not
become stagnant backwaters of caprice and lawlessness.2 7
The rule against reviewability that Rehnquist invoked, Marshall
protested, did not exist except in the area of criminal prosecutions,
and even there the courts had imposed limitations. 2" The analogy
to criminal prosecutions, moreover, was not a good one. An
agency's decision not to enforce a regulatory statute could deprive
regulatory beneficiaries of benefits Congress intended to bestow
upon them," 9 or threaten them with dangers Congress sought to
avoid, in the way that a prosecutor's decision not to proceed under
a criminal statute would not.u° "A request that a nuclear plant
said to violate plaintiff's constitutional rights. 470 U.S. at 838. Webster v. Doe,
486 U.S. 592 (1988), however, later made clear that a constitutional claim is
never barred by § 701(a)(2); the Constitution always provides "law to apply."
486 U.S. at 601-05.
234. 470 U.S. at 838.
235. But see Levin, supra note 54, at 712-13, 715-20 (the Court in Chaney
was groping toward a more complex, functional approach to replace the Overton
Park test).
236. 470 U.S. at 840 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment).





THE WAYNE LAW REVIEW
be operated safely or that prosecution be provided against unsafe
drugs is quite different from a request that an individual be put
in jail or his property confiscated as punishment for past violations
of the criminal law."241 A presumption of unreviewability was
therefore untrue to the premises of administrative law: "one of
the very purposes fueling the birth of administrative agencies was
the reality that governmental refusal to act could have just as
devastating an effect upon life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness
as coercive governmental action.''242
Marshall thus argued that any presumption of unreviewability
was inappropriate. Indeed, he continued, since the question of
whether there was "law to apply" would ultimately collapse into
the merits, 243 the Court should simply proceed to that issue.2" The
FDA's action should be upheld, he concluded, because the agency's
bona fide decision to allocate its resources to more pressing prob-
lems was within the discretion granted it by statute, not because
nonenforcement decisions are somehow invulnerable to review. 245
Marshall has the better of the argument, I think, as to whether
there should be a "presumption" against review of agency inaction.
Review at the behest of statutory beneficiaries vindicates the leg-
islative will by ensuring that programs enacted by Congress are in
fact executed. While decisions whether to take enforcement action
require reconciliation of a variety of competing factors, some of
which are peculiarly within the agency's expertise, the same is true
of many agency decisions that are nonetheless routinely subject to
241. Id.
242. Id. at 851.
243. Id. at 852-53. Marshall argued in Chaney that agency action inconsistent
with "traditional principles of rationality and fair process" should be deemed
reviewable and illegal under the APA even in the absence of explicit statutory
constraint. On that basis, he argued that reviewability should always collapse
into the merits. See id. at 853. This position seems to me to be a shift from
Marshall's otherwise consistent emphasis on the centrality of statutory directives
in judicial review. See, e.g., supra notes 98-108 and accompanying text. That
shift, I believe, was not necessary to Marshall's point in Chaney. Agency decisions
that are the products of such factors as "bribe[s], vindictiveness or retaliation,"
470 U.S. at 852, are reviewable without any need for recourse to "traditional
principles of rationality and fair process": Even a statute that merely enjoins the
agency to promote the "public interest" provides standards that exclude bribery
as a legitimate decisional factor. See Sunstein, Reviewing Agency Inaction After
Heckler v. Chaney, 52 U. Cm. L. REv. 653, 677 (1985).
244. 470 U.S. at 853.
245. Id. at 842.
[Vol. 38:115
ADMINISTRATIVE STATE
review. Those considerations go to the scope of review, not to
reviewability. 246
While nonenforcement decisions do not involve government
coercion, it is hardly clear why a "noncoercive" flouting of the
legislative mandate should be less subject to review than a coercive
one.247 Such an action can still be quite damaging to regulatory
beneficiaries, and, in any case, courts routinely review "noncoer-
cive" decisions such as the denial of AFDC or disability benefits. 2"
Nor does the "take Care" clause pose any more of a bar here
than it does in the typical case of review of agency action; in both
cases, judicial review promotes separation of powers by ensuring
executive adherence to the legislative command. 249 Where plaintiffs'
argument that agency laxness or arbitrariness has frustrated con-
gressional intent would otherwise be successful on the merits, it
seems peculiar to deny the courts their law-enforcement function
and to send plaintiffs back to the legislature that already decided
the issue in their favor.250
The Chaney presumption, thus, can be justified only in the
same manner as the Chevron blanket rule: it can be seen as an
attempt to tip the scales against review in order to forestall
incorrect decisions by lower courts, which might otherwise misapply
the Overton Park test and grant review in inappropriate cases.
There was no evidence in Chaney, however, beyond the ruling
below, that such decisions were in fact a problem.
Marshall's rejection of the Chaney presumption repudiates the
Court's "tilt" against review when an agency has declined to take
enforcement action; it is responsive to his convictions regarding
the need for judicial oversight of agency decisions. Marshall's
Chaney opinion, indeed, reflects basic themes that characterize his
administrative-law jurisprudence as a whole. It reiterates his skep-
ticism concerning agency action: administrative discretion "can be
a veil for laziness, corruption, incompetency, lack of will or other
246. Considerations such as ripeness and finality will bar review of admin-
istrative inaction in a variety of cases. See generally Environmental Defense Fund
v. Hardin, 428 F.2d 1093 (D.C. Cir. 1970). The mere fact that many cases of
agency inaction will be deemed nonreviewable under ordinary justiciability doc-
trine, however, is no reason to create a new doctrine barring review where that
law does not pose an obstacle.
247. See generally Sunstein, supra note 243, at 666-68.
248. See Levin, supra note 54, at 716-17.
249. But see Shapiro, supra note 85, at 464-67.
250. See Sunstein, supra note 110, at 475-77.
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motives.' 5'1 There is no substitute for judicial review, Marshall
believed, in checking those tendencies. At the same time, Chaney
illustrates Marshall's belief in properly directed government action,
and his commitment to vindicating the will of Congress requiring
such action. Judicial review, as Marshall understood it, should not
automatically favor government inaction over action. Rather, it is
a tool that courts must use against agencies lawlessly failing to do
what Congress has required.
VI. CONCLUSION
Marshall's vision of administrative law emphasized agencies'
obligation to adhere to governing statutory law. That obligation
was far-reaching. In order for courts to police the agencies, Mar-
shall believed, agency actions must be subject to searching judicial
scrutiny; courts can thereby guard the public against administrative
ignorance, laziness, corruption, or caprice. For Marshall, moreo-
ver, the appropriate judicial role extended as much to requiring
agencies to take actions Congress required of them as it did to
barring agencies from taking actions Congress forbade.
That vision of administrative law, however, is open to attack.
There is persuasive reason to believe that intrusive judicial review
has helped make agency action across the board more expensive
and time-consuming; judicial review has thus put obstacles in the
way of proper as well as improper government action. Courts have
reversed agency action on the basis of reasoning itself subject to
criticism, and have sometimes betrayed a profound lack of under-
standing of the substantive matters at issue. Moreover, it is not a
sufficient answer that judicial review will work well so long as
judges are uniformly intelligent and wise.2 2 "[Tihe wise judge' 1- 3
may not preside over every case;254 one cannot ignore the question
whether, in practice, Marshall's vision of administrative law has
produced better results than would have its competitors.
Marshall's answer to these attacks was straightforward. For
Marshall, notwithstanding any arguments that could be made
251. 470 U.S. at 848.
252. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 110, at 472 (notwithstanding "some
judicial errors," courts can evaluate detailed regulatory decisions without imposing
their own political or technical judgments so long as the relevant doctrine is
"properly understood").
253. Shapiro, supra note 85, at 470.
254. See generally R. MELNICK, supra note 81; Mashaw & Harfst, supra
note 59.
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against an active judicial role, the best protection of the citizenry
against administrative lawlessness could only lie in judges, oper-
ating in good faith and doing their jobs as best they could. Leaving
the relevant decisions in the agencies' hands would yield results
far worse. And in that, ultimately, I must agree. There is a tension
in the judicial-review system Marshall helped put in place. That
tension, however, flows inevitably from our desire to accommodate
an influential administrative policymaking role within a common-
law framework emphasizing the rule of law. Marshall helped show
us how it all could be done.
